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**El Salvador Example for Success**

**The Foreign Policy of the Philippines**

**Jihadists From Iraq: Future Threat**

**The Kingdom of Nepal**

**A New Intelligence Architecture**

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## ***El Salvador Sets The Example for Success*** ***MAJ Adrian D. Hope, USA, 48B***

*Throughout history, the countries of Central America have continuously struggled with shaping their identities. Since these countries were not in the highest positions on the list of global suppliers of natural resources or economic power houses, they did not always get top priority from the super powers of the world. However, there was a time during the mid 1980's that Central America did receive a lot of attention. These countries were receiving the attention of both super powers of that time, the United States and the Soviet Union. This was yet another region that the Cold War Super Powers were courting.*

In today's international political scene, there are many changes in regimes. Some have been initiated from within and some regimes have been changed by international coalitions. If these changes are so important, one would expect to see only the most powerful nations involved. However, why is the smallest country in Central America participating? El Salvador may be involved because the country itself has struggled through numerous regimes and a deadly civil war before beginning their successful democratic way of governance. It is quite possible that El Salvador is becoming an example of how democracy can prosper, even in countries that have been struggling for years.

This article will provide some information about the internal struggles of El Salvador from its independence to the present. The areas that will be addressed in this article will be a brief history of El Salvador to give the reader a background of the country and the determination of its people. Additionally, this article will look at aspects of the government and the population to determine what were the problems leading up to the Civil War during the 1980's and how the

country recovered and became a moderately stable democratic society. Finally, the article will provide some details of El Salvador's involvement in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

El Salvador has been reluctant to accept rule from outside parties throughout its history. Spain's first attempt to gain rule of this country in 1524 was unsuccessful due to the resistance of the indigenous people. However, in the following year, Spain was successful in acquiring the country as a territory. For about 300 years, El Salvador was used by Spain for its natural resources. During this time, Spain granted the elite large areas of land. These practices would develop the two classes in El Salvador for many centuries to come.

An example of the rebounding ability of this country was during the early twentieth century. El Salvador was quickly becoming a world leader in the export of coffee. This new economic growth stimulated the separation of the wealthy and poor by displacement. The wealthy landowners simply displaced the indigenous people to acquire more land for the production of coffee. When the world financial market was hit hard in the 1930's, El Salvador was greatly affected. This event sparked the desire for the working class people to unite and create an opposing political party.

The party that was created was the Communist Party of El Salvador, or simply PCS. And some scholars debate if they were responsible for the rebellion in 1932. Some academics believe it was the work of the Communist Party and some believe it was the tyranny of the military controlled government. The rebellion of 1932 was not very successful. This insurrection

started because of the inequality of land ownership. It started in the coffee growing regions of western El Salvador and lasted only a few days. Several thousand insurgents attacked the local symbols of power, targeting the elite and their property. Multiple municipal buildings were burned and all of their records were destroyed.<sup>1</sup>

The government was then under the newly empowered General Maximiliano Hernández-Martínez. His military commanders responded with the killings of the indigenous population. The estimated number killed range from as few as 10,000 to over 30,000 people.<sup>2</sup> The brutal response from the military sent a message to the country that rebellions would not be an option for the people. Most of the indigenous people were afraid to wear their traditional dress for fear that they would be killed by the army. This rebellion was another example of how the people of El Salvador did not support insurrections. It changed the way the people would react towards the government for almost fifty years. Revolutions from within the military or government are a different story. The same leader, General Hernández-Martínez came into power by a militarily led revolution. The government of El Salvador has been one that has been run primarily by the military.

These military leaders were appointed or “elected” and all of them were part of the ruling party of the time. There were not any multiparty elections until 1972. In 1972, the mayor of San Salvador José Napoleon Duarte was elected over the government’s Party, the National Conciliation Party (PCN), whose candidate was Colonel Arturo Armando Molina. The results of this election were not accepted by the government. This denouncement led to a coup attempt by Duarte and some military leaders who opposed the government’s decisions. The people did not support this coup because of the amount of distrust of the military. Duarte and the select military leaders who attempted this coup were captured and exiled.

1932 – 1934	General Maximiliano Hernández-Martínez
1934 – 1935	General Andres Ignacio Menendez
1935 – 1944	General Maximiliano Hernández-Martínez
1945 – 1945	General Osmin Aguirre y Salinas
1945 – 1948	General Salvador Castaneda Castro
1948 – 1950	Revolutionary Council of Government
1950 – 1956	Lt. Col Oscar Osorio
1956 – 1960	Colonel Jose Maria Lemus
1960 – 1961	Government Revolutionary Junta
1961 – 1962	Civil-Military Directorate
1962 – 1967	Colonel Julio A. Rivera
1967 – 1972	General Fidel Sanchez Hernandez
1972 – 1977	Colonel Arturo Armando Molina
1977 – 1979	General Carlos Humberto Romero

*Table 1. Heads of State in El Salvador (1931 – 1979)<sup>3</sup>*

The failures in the election system put the government at a disadvantage to the people. The government would have to change to gain the support of the people. The pivotal time in the history of the El Salvadoran government was in 1979. October 15<sup>th</sup>, 1979 was the day that General Carlos Humberto Romero’s government would fall and transformation in the government of El Salvador would begin. The new reforms included human rights concerns, the disbandment of corrupt paramilitary groups and changes in the electoral process.

The beginnings of a civil war were already under way when General Romero was peacefully removed from power. The Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS) was beginning to re-emerge in the 1970’s. The leader of the PCS, Shaffic Handel, realized that the party would not be able to gain power through the electoral process. Although the PCS was not officially recognized in El Salvador, Handel was able to infiltrate

labor unions and other non-violent means in pursuit of power.<sup>4</sup>

The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was able to make agreements with the military and change the population's perception of elections. Along with the changes to the elections, the PDC wanted to introduce country wide reforms to adjust the economic situation in the country. The most influential reform was the agrarian reform, which will be discussed later in the paper. In 1982 the first democratic elections were held for congress. This election was supported and monitored by international organizations and these elections inspired the population. The newly elected congress emplaced a temporary president, Alvaro Magana, until elections could be organized in 1984. The military maintained many of its positions in the Cabinet and control of the actions against the insurgents during the civil war. The civilian authorities attempted to assume control over the military, but were not effective in their attempts. The control over the military by the civilian leadership would not occur until after the end of the civil war.

The elections for the presidency were held in 1984. José Napoleon Duarte<sup>5</sup> was the first civilian elected as president in an open electoral process. This election was also supervised and approved by the international community and was reorganized again during the Peace Accords in the early 1990's. The reorganization would allow for the opposition party to become part of the political process.

After the official declaration of the end of the civil war, El Salvador's government and its processes began to take a democratic shape. Since 1992 there have been increasing voter registrations and higher percentages of voter turn out. This is due to the trends that the voters are gaining confidence in the pluralist political system. In the most recent elections<sup>6</sup> approximately 66% of the registered voters elected Antonio Saca, a

candidate from the ARENA - Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance) party. Saca's main opponent was Shaffic Handel, from the FMLN - Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Front Farabundo Marti) party.<sup>7</sup>

The government of El Salvador has progressed since the dark times of the oppressive military regimes and questionable activities during the civil war. The area that may have been responsible for the civil war was the inequality of the economic classes of the country. This was briefly mentioned earlier in the paper and now the paper will look at Roy Prosterman's Index for Rural Instability (IRI)<sup>8</sup> to determine if there are any contributing factors from the population and the civil war. First, an explanation of Prosterman's IRI is necessary.

In 1976, Roy Prosterman simplified the issue of peasants and revolutions. He first defines three categories of peasant upheavals:

- Category 1 (and the dominant category, in terms both of lives lost and of political impact): conflicts in which peasants have been mobilized along "class" or economic lines, primarily around the issue of land tenure, and sometimes secondarily around the issue of agricultural credit.
- Category 2: conflicts in which peasants have been mobilized along geographic or tribal lines, chiefly around the issue of independence or "nation-state" status.
- Category 3: riot like conflicts without any clear structure or issue, stemming chiefly from the frustrations of deep poverty.<sup>9</sup>

Clearly El Salvador's civil war can be categorized in category one. The intent of the communist party (PCS) prior to the civil war was to disrupt the democratic system that was emerging. Since the PCS already recognized that they would not be able to infiltrate the political system,

they would attempt to organize the peasants based on the inequalities of the economy. There is an estimate that upwards to 68% of the population in El Salvador was living below the poverty line at the beginning of the civil war.<sup>10</sup> This would give the opposition an opportunity to entice the population to join its revolution to destroy the government. Additional intentions of the opposition will be discussed later in the paper.

The second part of Prosterman's simplified IRI is the values of which the prediction of a revolution or conflict could occur. These values are defined as the percentage of landless peasants in a country or region.<sup>11</sup> There have been numerous articles written about the agrarian reforms in El Salvador. These represent the idea that there was a problem within the domestic economic issues of the country and they needed to be addressed. Some of the leaders in the government prior to the civil war attempted to implement agrarian reforms but they were not successful.

According to Prosterman when a country's percentage of landless reaches 30% or more, they are at a "substantial danger" level. And when the index reaches 40% or greater, the country is in "critical danger" of a revolution. The "landless peasants" percentage in 1976 was estimated to be around 20%, according to Prosterman. In 1980 that number was believed to be closer to 70%.<sup>12</sup> The Junta in El Salvador in 1980 was attempting to adjust these figures to keep the PCS from using this as a way to start a revolution.

The possibility of a revolution from the landless peasants in 1980 could have been a repeat of Salvadorian history. As stated earlier, the revolution of 1932 was believed to be incited by the communist party and included the landless peasants of the early twentieth century. However, this time the government delivered on its promises of agrarian reform. In the early months of 1980, "Phase I" of the land reform and "Declaration 207 – 'Land-to-the-tenants'" was en-

acted which transferred about 44% of the cultivated land and adjusted the landless peasant population to 11%.<sup>13</sup> According to Prosterman's IRI, the timing of a revolution is not dependent exclusively on the factors of the landless peasants. He states there are additional factors that must be considered. This is where he defines four additional facilitating factors for a revolution.

1. Ideology, leadership, communications.
2. Onerousness of landlord system and availability of credit.
3. Traditions of arms bearing bellicosity among the peasantry, versus deep-rooted pacifism, passivity, fatalism.
4. Effectiveness of government control and repression.<sup>14</sup>

Salvadorians had many contingents to overcome if they were going to avoid the civil war. The additional factors listed are good reasons for the civil war. The leadership and ideology of the government in the late 1970's was changing for the better of the population. However, they still were not able to effectively communicate their goals to the people, because there needed to be time for adjustment and trust to grow between the two groups. This weakness was seized by the guerilla groups and they used it to ignite their operations.

The land system was changing, but had been a disadvantage to the people since the beginning of history for this country. There was always a separation of the classes and like most Third World nations; there was a large gap between the rich and the poor. This was another advantage that the insurgent forces wanted to capture. The opposition was betting on the fact that if they could convince enough of the poor, they would rise up and join their forces. However, because of the active agrarian reforms, the leftist groups could only bring about 2,000 protesters into the streets of San Salvador in May of 1980, where as in January of the same year, they were able to truck in around 100,000 protesters.<sup>15</sup>

The fourth factor was the most difficult for

the government of El Salvador. They were not very effective in control or repression. This led to the poor decisions by the leaders to condone the actions of the Death Squads. These groups were responsible for many deaths; the most infamous was the assassination of Oscar Romero. Romero was an Archbishop who was an advocate of social change. One day after Romero addressed the military forces, pleading for them to obey the law of God and stop the killing, he was assassinated. This was a disappointing event for the Salvadorians, which tainted their perception of the government and its policies. This event also had affects on the international scale as well. These events were fuel for the guerrilla forces to support their cause.

The opposition was a divided, but commonly focused, communist party. The political organizations included: The Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS), Farabundo Martí Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), People's Revolutionary Army (ERP or PRS), Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN or RN), and the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC). Additionally, there were some key military insurgency organizations. They were the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL) from the PCS, Popular Army of Liberation (ELP) and Popular Liberation Armed Forces (FAPL) from the FPL, Salvadoran Revolution Party or Revolutionary Army (ERP) from ERP, Armed Forces of National Resistance or National Resistance (RN) from the FARN-RN, and the Armed Commando of Liberation (CAL) from the PRTC.<sup>16</sup>

These organizations were reorganized as the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) as the coordinating body and the front organization the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) was created to attract international political support.<sup>17</sup> This organization began collecting international support, mainly from communist countries. Additionally they received training and support from the Sandinistas in neighboring Nicaragua. These ties to the international com-

munist organizations were enough to get the United States involved. There was the fear that the "domino theory" would take place in Central America.<sup>18</sup> The FMLN initiated their "final offensive" in January of 1981. This did not succeed, due mainly to the lack of support from the population. There were successful free and democratic elections occurring and the changes in the agrarian reforms diminished the power of the FMLN politically.

The FMLN-FDR would continue its struggle to gain power in El Salvador. However, there were two international conditions that led to the loss of power for the guerrilla forces. The first event was the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980's. Without the support of the Communist Super Power, many attempts of communism around the world failed. The second event was the loss of power of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Because the FMLN-FDR insurgents were receiving the training and supplies through the Sandinistas, they lost that connection when the Sandinistas lost power.

These international issues changed the priority of the United States' foreign policy towards El Salvador. Initially, during President Jimmy Carter's administration, the main concern with El Salvador was with the human rights violations. Since these violations occurred on both sides, President Carter eliminated financial support for the military of El Salvador. However the Carter Administration could not focus its support in Central America or El Salvador. In addition to domestic issues, President Carter had additional international concerns in the late 1970's, mainly the Iran Hostage Crisis.

When President Reagan was elected in 1980, he was very eager to join in the fight against communism. Since the weapons and training for El Salvador's rebels were coming mainly from Nicaragua, the Reagan administration attempted to negotiate a peaceful settlement through diplomatic channels. Assistant Secre-

tary of State Thomas O. Enders visited Managua in August 1981 and offered to renew economic assistance in exchange for an end to Sandinista support for the guerrillas.<sup>19</sup> The Sandinistas never responded to the offers.

A year later, a second attempt was made by the United States for Nicaragua to change to a pluralistic political system that it had made with the agreements with the Organization of American States (OAS). Since the direct efforts of the United States were not working, the Reagan Administration supported the efforts of other Central and Southern American countries that were attempting to settle the issues of the civil war. Most of the actions taken by the Reagan Administration have been tainted by the public's perception due to the covert operations that were later exposed.

The United States was willing to invest a large amount of money and some military assistance to insure that the communist backed insurgents would not succeed. Between 1980 and 1990, the United States spent more than \$4.5 billion in El Salvador (\$1.3 billion in the form of direct military assistance, and over \$850 million in unsubsidized credits.) In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spent an estimated \$500 million dollars to support the Salvadoran government, promote democracy, and prevent the establishment of a communist regime.<sup>20</sup>

When President George H. Bush came into office, the FMLN-FDR had lost a lot of momentum. Additionally, they still did not have sufficient support to become involved in the political processes of the country. There were some internal negotiations that were making progress between the government and the FMLN. Furthermore, the enticements from other Latin American countries for the FMLN to end the civil war were very inviting.

Despite disagreements within the Reagan and Bush Administrations, both Presidents were inclined to support the elected Presidents of El

Salvador. Following the 1984 election of Jose Napoleon Duarte, the Regan administration cooperated closely with him despite the displeasure of many in Reagan's own party over Duarte's nationalization of banking and of the marketing of sugar and coffee.<sup>21</sup> President Bush faced the same indifferences within his administration when Alfredo Cristiani was elected in 1989 and some Democratic Congressmen disagreed with the political party of Cristiani. However, the support provided by both Presidents Reagan and Bush allowed the democratic process in El Salvador to gain legitimacy in the international political realm.

During the peace negotiations, representatives from the Salvadoran government, the FMLN, the Catholic Church, the United Nations and the OAS were involved the peace process. There were multiple meetings between these organizations, but the United States found itself only in an observational role. The leaders of the FMLN did not want the United States playing a major role in the peace accords. Because of the increasing domestic issues, the United States was satisfied with performing the role of an observer.

Following the successful peace negotiations, El Salvador developed multiple political parties, to include the FMLN. If you look at the organization of El Salvador today, it can be considered a functioning democracy. The country has a proportional, pluralistic democratic system. According to the data from Freedomhouse.org, the country is considered to achieve the rankings of a "2" in political rights, a "3" in civil liberties, and its status is considered to be "Free."<sup>22</sup> The country is considered to have a perception of a high level of corruption, but the population believes in the democratic process.

Following over ten years of democratic elections, the relationship between the United States and El Salvador has continued to be beneficial for both countries. The United States has continued to provide financial assistance to



El Salvador. Following some of the most severe natural disasters, the relationship between the countries strengthened. The United States provided \$37.7 million in assistance following Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and \$168 million in reconstruction assistance following two major earthquakes in 2001.<sup>23</sup>

Recently El Salvador was the first country in Central America to sign up for the Dominican-Republic, Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA.) The countries involved in this agreement are: the United States, the Dominican-Republic, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. DR-CAFTA addresses the areas of increasing workers rights, intellectual property protection, environmental standards, legal protection for US investors, and expanded markets for US farmers.<sup>24</sup> This free trade agreement should improve international financial relationships between the United States and Central America, much like the success of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

There has been more than a financial relationship between the U.S. and El Salvador. There has been a lasting relationship with military training and exercises. Despite pressures from the FMLN party and the disapproval of over 70% of the population, El Salvador has supported the United States in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Since August of 2003, El Salvador has had a presence of troops in support of OIF.

El Salvador has provided four contingencies and is contemplating a fifth. The first rotation (August 2003 – February 2004) consisted of Special Forces with a mission of security and stability operation vicinity of An Najaf, Iraq. During the second rotation (February 2004 – August 2004), the Salvadorians raised the number of troops deployed to 380, this was the maximum allowed by the Legislative Assembly. Their mission was similar to the first rotations. The third and fourth rotation of Salvadorian troops

(August 2004 – August 2005) shifted their focus to reconstruction projects.<sup>25</sup>

The commitment of the El Salvadorian government to provide continued support for OIF demonstrates that they believe in democracy. Some critics may think that only 380 soldiers can not make a difference, but they can. Combined, the third and fourth rotations have completed over 114 reconstruction task and projects. These projects have a monetary value in excess of \$4.6 million, but the example that El Salvador is setting is invaluable to any country that inspires to become or supports a functional democracy.<sup>26</sup>

This article defined the history of the people and the government of El Salvador and the events that each group has endured, to create a democratic state. Like many countries in Latin America, the political system has changed over time. El Salvador has been successful at maintaining its democracy since the end of their civil war in 1992. The involvement of the United States and other international regimes set an example for El Salvador to follow.

There is a solid government in El Salvador and it is very capable of making its own decisions, without having to feel pressure from the international community. The efforts to support the international effort in Iraq may be directly related to the assistance that was given to El Salvador during the 1980's and early 1990's. After years of democracy, El Salvador has an example to share with the international community. Through the efforts of the people, the government and international organizations, El Salvador is succeeding as a democratic state.

### **Endnotes**

<sup>1</sup> Eric Ching, "In Search of the Party: The Communist Party, the Comintern, and the Peasant Rebellion of 1932 in El Salvador," *The Americas*. Vol. 55, No. 2 (Oct., 1998), 204-239.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 206.

<sup>3</sup> Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, "El Salvador – Why a Revolution?" *NACLA Report on the Americas*. Vol. XIV, No. 4 (July – August 1980), 46.

<sup>4</sup> Salvador A. Giralt-Barraza, "On the Road to Democracy: Civil-Military Relations in El Salvador," Masters of Science, Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School, December 1998.

<sup>5</sup> This is the same José Napoleon Duarte who won the elections in 1972 but was denied by the military government from taking office and subsequently exiled.

<sup>6</sup> The most recent elections were Presidential elections held in March of 2004. This percentage of voter turn out is the highest recorded in Salvadoran political history.

<sup>7</sup> This information was obtained from [www.electionworld.org](http://www.electionworld.org).

<sup>8</sup> Roy L. Prosterman, "'IRI': A Simplified Predictive Index of Rural Instability" *Comparative Politics*. Vol. 8, No. 3, Special Issue on Peasants and Revolution. (April, 1976), 339-353.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, 341.

<sup>10</sup> The Central American Refugee Center (CARECEN), [www.icomm.ca/carecen](http://www.icomm.ca/carecen) accessed May 10, 2005.

<sup>11</sup> Prosterman, 339. Prosterman's definition is as follows: "The present article considers "peasant" to encompass all persons living in an economically less developed society, whose primary source of livelihood comes from tilling the land or animal husbandry. The term "landless peasantry" is used here to mean all such persons to the extent that they have no ownership or ownership-like security of tenure on the land which constitutes that source of livelihood. Thus, they are included whether, for other purposes of categorization, they may be considered itinerant farm laborers, full-time farm laborers, sharecroppers, tenant farmers, squatters without secure farming rights, or herdsmen without secure grazing rights."

<sup>12</sup> Roy L. Prosterman, Jeffrey M. Riedinger, and Mary N. Temple. "Land Reform and the El Salvador Crisis" *International Security*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Summer, 1981), 67.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 61-62, 67.

<sup>14</sup> Prosterman, "'IRI': A Simplified Predictive Index of Rural Instability" 347-348.

<sup>15</sup> Prosterman, Riedinger, Temple, 68.

<sup>16</sup> Giralt-Barraza, 13.

<sup>17</sup> John Norton Moore, "The Secret War in Central America and the Future World Order." *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 80, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), 43-127.

<sup>18</sup> Jerome Slater, "Dominos in Central America. Will They Fall? Does It Matter?," *International Security*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Fall, 1987), 105.

<sup>19</sup> Moore, 70.

<sup>20</sup> J.D. Waghelstein, "El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in Counterinsurgency." Study Project published by the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1985.

<sup>21</sup> Ernest Evans, "El Salvador's Lessons for Future U. S. Interventions." *World Affairs*, Vol.160, No. 1 (Summer, 1997), 45.

<sup>22</sup> These rankings are provided by [freedomhouse.org](http://freedomhouse.org). Rating of 2—Countries and territories rated 2 in political rights are less free than those rated 1. Such factors as political corruption, violence, political discrimination against minorities, and foreign or military influence on politics may be present and weaken the quality of freedom. Civil Liberties ratings of 3, 4, 5—Countries and territories that have received a rating of 3, 4, or 5 range from those that are in at least partial compliance with virtually all checklist standards to those with a combination of high or medium scores for some questions and low or very low scores on other questions. The level of oppression increases at each successive rating level, particularly in the areas of censorship, political terror, and the prevention of free association. There are also many cases in which groups opposed to the state engage in political terror that undermines other freedoms. Therefore, a poor rating for a country is not necessarily a comment on the intentions of the government, but may reflect real restrictions on liberty caused by nongovernmental actors. The combined average of these two ratings determine if a country is considered to be "Free" – 1- 2.5, "Partially Free" – 3 – 5.5, and "Not Free" 5.5 – 7.

<sup>23</sup> Clare Ribando, US Department of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, *Report for Congress: El Salvador: Political, Economic, and Social Conditions and Relations with the United States*. January, 2005.

<sup>24</sup> Office of the United States Trade Representative, <http://www.ustr.gov>, accessed May 07, 2005.

<sup>25</sup> Department of Defense, United States Military Group, El Salvador. Talking Points memorandum, June 2005.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*.

# ***The Foreign Policy of the Philippines: Expanding the Discussion***

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## **Introduction**

The Philippines is a key location in the expanding global War on Terror. In April 2005, for example, Joseph Mussomeli, United States Embassy chargé d'affaires, stated that the southern Philippines may become the next Afghanistan because of the continued presence of terrorists. He also indicate that Mindanao is almost the new 'Mecca' for terrorism. More broadly, the Philippines is viewed as a keystone within Southeast Asia, a region described as the 'Second Front' in the War on Terror.

The 'place' of the Philippines in the War on Terror, however, and, relatedly, the war in Iraq, has been controversial to say the least. Initially a stalwart supporter of the Coalition of the Willing, the Philippine government surprised many when it acquiesced to the demands of insurgents in Iraq. The decision of Philippine president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in July 2004 to pull-out the Filipino peace-keeping contingent in light of the abduction of contract worker Angelo de la Cruz shocked and angered many officials throughout the world. Ruth Urry, assistant information officer of the United States was dismayed by the action, saying "This decision sends the wrong signal."<sup>1</sup> U.S. State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher explained that "We think that withdrawal sends the wrong signal and that it is important for the people to stand up to terrorists and now allow them to change our behavior."<sup>2</sup> In Australia, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer branded the Macapagal-Arroyo administration's decision as "marshmallowlike."<sup>3</sup>

What contributed to the Philippines turn-of-course regarding the situation in Iraq? Why did

the Philippines agree to withdraw its forces from Iraq after the abduction of de la Cruz? This brief paper is both a summary and an extension of my previous work.<sup>4</sup> My guiding questions are simple: How are we to interpret the Philippines' participation in global affairs? What are the motivating factors behind the foreign policy of the Philippines? I maintain that many accounts of the Philippines' foreign policy fail to adequately consider some of the more salient elements, namely overseas employment and religion. This paper raises these issues in an attempt to broaden the discussion of the Philippines' participation in the Coalition of the Willing.

## **President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo**

Macapagal-Arroyo brings an interesting mix of beliefs and backgrounds to her presidency. Born April 5, 1947, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is the daughter of former Philippine president Diosdado Macapagal and Eva Macaraeg Macapagal. She attended high school at the Assumption Convent (1960-1964) and later earned a bachelor's degree in commerce and economics from Assumption College. Afterwards, she received a master's degree in economics from Ateneo de Manila University (1978) and a doctorate in economics from the University of the Philippines (1985). This training, in part, accounts for her neoliberal outlook in policy matters.

Professionally, Macapagal-Arroyo has held various academic and political positions, including professorships at Ateneo de Manila, Assumption College, and the University of the Philippines. She also served as assistant secretary in the Department of Trade and Industry (1987-1989) and later as undersecretary (1989-1992).

In 1992 Macapagal-Arroyo was elected to the Senate; she was reelected in 1995, receiving the highest number of votes ever by any politician in Philippine electoral history. She considered running for president in 1998 but ultimately agreed to run for vice president. In the Philippines, the president and vice president are elected separately by direct popular vote.

Macapagal-Arroyo won the vice presidency, being elected opposite President Joseph Estrada. A former film star turned politician, Estrada's presidency was plagued with charges of corruption. Impeachment proceedings began and Estrada was forced to step down. At this point Macapagal-Arroyo assumed, in January 2001, the presidency of the Philippines.

The presidential administration of Macapagal-Arroyo was borne of political maneuvering and internal factions. After the Philippine Supreme Court unanimously supported her assumption of the presidency, for example, thousands of Estrada supporters stormed the presidential palace. Macapagal-Arroyo was compelled to declare a 'state of rebellion'. It is not surprising, therefore, that she has pursued a policy of solidarity and reconciliation in an effort to reunite the Philippines. However, these objectives are also part of her Catholic faith. She has noted on numerous occasions that she is carrying out God's will in her work. In December 2002 she discerned that it was God's will to not run for president in 2004; later, in October of 2003, she reversed her decision, stating that she was responding to God's will, that it was her duty to lead the Filipino people.

Macapagal-Arroyo brings a political fundamentalism to Philippine foreign policy. After taking office she repeatedly indicated that she would stress her government's adherence to Catholic dictums. Macapagal-Arroyo met on several occasions with Pope John Paul II; it was not uncommon for reverends or bishops to attend special

cabinet meetings. Consequently, Macapagal-Arroyo's foreign policy was to be based on adherence to a strict reading of the Bible and the doctrines of the Catholic church. Four elements, based by a Catholic vision of peace, underscored her geopolitics: human rights, development, solidarity, and world order.

In short, Macapagal-Arroyo brings to her administration a neoliberal political fundamentalism. Her moral politics are infused with a strong element of economic globalization. Her representation of globalization, however, is theological: an underlying, unrelenting force that drives nations and their economies forward. In her presidency, she has advocated a neoliberal position in her quest to eliminate poverty; this approach, however, must be morally informed.

### **Foreign Policy Realities of the Philippines**

President Macapagal-Arroyo has detailed her foreign policy perspective in numerous speeches. On July 12, 2001, for example, Macapagal-Arroyo, in her speech delivered on the 103rd Foundation Day of the Department of Foreign Affairs, outlined eight policies or 'realities' that she urged the department to advance. The first reality was that China, Japan, and the US would retain a determining influence in the security situation and economic evolution of Asia. She spoke in support of a "blossoming" of Philippine-US relations that are "responsive to the new realities of globalization and the conjunction of democracy and the market." Her second reality was to situate Philippine foreign policy more firmly with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). It would be through the Philippines' commitment to ASEAN, Macapagal-Arroyo surmised, that the country would achieve global competitiveness toward attaining sustainable growth and development. Her third reality was to form stronger bilateral relations with Islamic countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and others. A fourth reality was to promote greater multilateral and interregional co-

operation within East Asia, while a fifth reality was to protect the national territory of the Philippines. The sixth and seventh realities addressed investment and tourism, respectively; combined, these addressed specific means of promoting economic growth and development within the Philippines. Lastly, Macapagal-Arroyo announced her eighth reality: the assertion that overseas Filipinos would continue to play a critical role in the country's economic and social stability.<sup>5</sup>

### **The Salience of Overseas Employment**

Within the Philippines, overseas employment has assumed monumental proportions. In 2004 alone the Philippines deployed 933,588 overseas contract workers (OCWs) to over 200 countries and territories. These workers remitted approximately US\$8.5 billion. Within the first three months alone of 2005 Filipino OCWs have remitted US\$2.3 billion, an increase of 17 percent from the previous year. Proportionately, remittances from migrant workers have sustained the Philippines' fragile economy. In aggregate terms, for example, the amount of earnings contributed to the gross national product by remittances from 1975 to 1994—a sum totaling US\$18 billion—was approximately four times larger than the total foreign direct investment for the same period.<sup>6</sup>

As expressed in Macapagal-Arroyo's eighth reality, overseas employment is a crucial element in the Philippines' foreign policy. Moreover, it was the expected financial gain from a participation in the rebuilding of Iraq that motivated the Philippine government during the months leading to the war in Iraq. Ultimately, on April 14, 2003, as US Pentagon officials declared a cessation of major combat operations in Iraq, Macapagal-Arroyo signed Executive Orders 194 and 195. With the first order, the president approved the formation of a public-private sector task force to coordinate Philippine participation in the postwar reconstruction of Iraq. The second order established an additional task force to provide humanitarian assistance to Iraq. The Philip-

pine government, through the reconstruction task force, hoped to garner substantial labor contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq. This would be accomplished through contractual arrangements with American and other (mostly Kuwaiti) construction firms, such as Kellogg, Brown & Root and Bechtel. Officials in the Philippines anticipated future deployments of between 30,000 and 100,000 contract workers to Iraq. In a combination of Catholicism and neoliberalism, Macapagal-Arroyo viewed the War on Terror as an opportunity to confront poverty in the Philippines through the export of labor. Overseas employment as foreign policy would thus eliminate two interrelated problems: poverty and, by extension, terrorism. This could be accomplished through the peaceful promotion of Iraqi development through solidarity and humanitarian intervention.

The windfall of contract work to Iraq never materialized. In part, certain officials, including the president, were reluctant to deploy sizeable numbers of workers to Iraq until conditions stabilized. Increased insurgent attacks foreclosed the possibility of mass deployments. Between April 2003 and July 2004, however, despite the bombings and assassinations in Iraq, thousands of Filipinos did enter the country to facilitate reconstruction projects. The majority of Philippine contract workers were employed on U.S. military installations.<sup>7</sup>

With the abduction of de la Cruz in July 2004, however, Macapagal-Arroyo worked to suspend the deployment of laborers to Iraq. She issued a series of bans, barring the deployment of Filipinos to the country. Critics of both Macapagal-Arroyo and the ban on deployment contend that the Philippines stands to lose over US\$100 million in remittances. Economically, therefore, the decisions of the Philippine president regarding overseas employment and Iraq do not appear to make sense. What else accounts for her actions?

### **Separatist Movements and Armed Insurgencies**

Three Islamic separatist groups are active in the Philippines. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), established in 1968; the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), established in 1977; and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), established in the 1990s. Similar in demands for sovereign Islamic state, but through long histories, have agreed to increased autonomy. On-again, off-again peace negotiations, truces, and settlements. All have been active throughout Mindanao, the largest island of the southern Philippines. Also in more peripheral islands... The ASG has been linked to al Qaeda. Both the MILF and MNLF have distanced themselves from the ASG.

Apart from Islamic separatist groups, a number of revolutionary movements have emerged in the Philippines. The most salient group, for current purposes, is the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), founded in 1968. Maoist in its ideology, the CPP has maintained a guerrilla campaign to overthrow the Philippine government. The CPP is supported by its military wing, the New People's Army (NPA). Operationally, the NPA primarily targets local politicians, judges, government informers, as well as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). According to officials of the Philippine government, the CPP-NPA maintains 107 guerrilla fronts nationwide. Geographically, they are most active throughout Luzon, the Visayas, and parts of Mindanao.

Recently, there have been allegations of ties between the CPP and the MILF. Spokespersons for the MILF, however, have denied these charges, noting only that any alliance between the two groups was demarcate spheres of operation, to prevent them from accidentally fighting with each other in their respective campaigns against the government.

Combined, the Philippine president is beset with internal conflicts. These, not surprisingly, have influenced her foreign policy, both positively and negatively. The Macapagal-Arroyo administration has assumed—or hoped—that overseas employment will contribute directly to the reduction of poverty in the Philippines generally, and Mindanao specifically. Also, through its humanitarian work in the reconstruction of Iraq, the administration believed that it would appear sympathetic to Muslim Filipinos. On the negative side, however, the decisions of Macapagal-Arroyo could lead to greater instability. During the de la Cruz incident, for example, the NPA announced that it would lead moves to overthrow the president if de la Cruz was killed. These warnings came amid tense settlement talks with both the CCP and the MILF. The response of Macapagal-Arroyo to domestic insurgents and separatists, moreover, were (and still are) related to an even more immediate threat, namely that of a military coup.

### **Threats and the Armed Forces of the Philippines**

On July 27, 2003, approximately three hundred junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) staged a coup in an attempt to depose Macapagal-Arroyo. And although the mutineers surrendered within 24 hours, the attempt has continued to haunt the present administration. Throughout their trial, the mutineers maintained that the attempt was a spontaneous act prompted by corruption in government and poor management of the military. However, subsequent fact-finding commissions concluded that the mutiny was part of a larger conspiracy to seize power from the government and to restore the ousted Estrada to the presidency.

The 2003 mutiny reveals significant cracks in the Philippine power structure. It is also an indication that the AFP does not share

the same philosophy as that of the presidency. As discussed below, the AFP stands to gain from a strong relationship with the U.S. Moreover, unlike Macapagal-Arroyo, the AFP, in general, is not supportive of reconciliation with the various separatist groups and insurgents.

Domestic threats to the presidency remain. Throughout the early part of 2005 there have been numerous rumors of further military coups against Macapagal-Arroyo. Most recently, as the Philippines' prepared to celebrate the 107<sup>th</sup> anniversary of independence on June 12, threats of anti-government protests and calls for the ouster of Macapagal-Arroyo were widespread.<sup>8</sup>

### **The Strains of US-Philippine Relations**

As indicated in Macapagal-Arroyo's first reality, relations with the United States, in particular, are extremely salient to the political and economic course of events in the Philippines. In part, this relates to the legacies of American colonialism and neocolonialism in the archipelago. Historically, there has developed a patron-client style relationship between Filipino and American politicians, a relationship Anthony Woodiwiss terms *mendicant patriarchalism*. Patriarchalism refers to a "familialist discourse that, regardless of the institutional context, both assumes the naturalness of inequalities in the social relations between people and justifies these by reference to the respect due to a benevolent father or father-figure." Mendicant means 'begging', and has been used in the Philippine literature to denote the debased form of patriarchalist practice that has become the established mode of exercising power within the society-political leaders, before and after independence in 1946, begged Americans for favors so that the former could in turn respond to the Philippine populace who were begging for favors.<sup>9</sup> I argue that the Philippine government's acquiescence to U.S. foreign policy, as well as its rush to be identified as a member of the Coalition of the Willing, may partially be understood through the lens of mendicant patriarchalism. Through its support of the Bush Administration, certain politicians and military sectors stood to gain considerably

through either influence and recognition (e.g., being seen as friends of the Americans) or through monies and supplies. In May 2003, for example, Macapagal-Arroyo made a state visit to the United States. At that time, the U.S. elevated the Philippines' status to a full-fledged partner in the war on terrorism. Bush also disclosed plans to classify the country as a 'major non-NATO ally', a designation that would make it easier for the Philippine government to acquire military equipment. Additionally, the U.S. promised to provide thirty helicopters to the Armed Forces of the Philippines.<sup>10</sup>

The establishment of strong ties with the U.S. carries risk, both domestically and internationally. Within the Philippines, anti-government forces, such as the NPA and MILF are opposed to the close ties between the Philippines and the United States. Moreover, opposition leaders, such as former Estrada supporters, accuse Macapagal-Arroyo as being a 'puppet' of the United States. Throughout 2003, for example, she was routinely charged with selling-out the sovereignty of the Philippines.

Internationally, the Philippine government has been attempting to maintain more cordial relations with Islamic states, both near (e.g., Malaysia and Indonesia) and far (Saudi Arabia). In part, these bilateral arrangements are seen as a way of fomenting peace and stability in the southern Philippines. Additionally, however, these relations benefit the continued export of labor to oil-rich Middle Eastern states. Stronger Philippine-U.S. relations may strain these connections, particularly if substantial anti-American sentiment develops in these Islamic states. Indeed, by aligning itself as part of America's Coalition of the Willing, the Philippine government finds itself at risk of alienating itself from its Muslim neighbors. This perception accounts for Macapagal-Arroyo's participation at the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).<sup>11</sup>

### **Concluding Observations**

The Philippines was a strong supporter of the Coalition of the Willing. However, the abduc-

tion of Angelo de la Cruz caused Macapagal-Arroyo to apparently waver in her commitment. Despite the warnings of neighboring countries (i. e., Australia and Singapore) and the United States, the Philippine president negotiated with the insurgents and secured the release of de la Cruz. The interpretation of her decision is complex. On one hand, she stands to alienate the thousands of Filipino workers who planned to obtain employment in Iraq. Likewise, her apparent 'soft' stance on terrorism does not strengthen her position vis-a-vis the AFP. Additionally, her decisions have weakened her position with other governments, including the United States, Australia, and Singapore. Arguably, she may stand to gain in her negotiations with the CCP, the MNLF, and the MILF. However, I do not believe that this is the catalyst behind her actions. Rather, I suggest, at this point, that her decisions to withdraw troops, ban deployments to Iraq, and secure the release of de la Cruz were consistent with a Catholic vision of peace. Her decision was not political in a realist sense, but instead religious. If this is the case, religious ideology must be more intimately incorporated into political analyses that is generally done.

As indicated above, rumors of coups remain. Moreover, critics have continued to challenge the presidential imposed ban of worker-deployment to Iraq. And abductions have continued. Most significant is that of Roberto Tarongoy. On November 1, 2004, Tarongoy—with five co-workers—was abducted at the Baghdad office of their firm, the Saudi Arabia Trading and Contracting Company. Tarongoy remains in captivity, along with an American, Roy Hallums. The militants initially demanded the withdrawal of all Filipino contract workers from Iraq and the cessation of logistics and security support by the Philippines to US forces in Iraq. These demands were coupled with a US\$10 million ransom in exchange for Tarongoy's release. Ironically, Tarongoy was in Iraq after violating the deployment ban.

Currently, approximately 6,000 Filipinos are employed in the country, mostly as sub-

contracted workers on US military bases. Consequently, overseas employment will continue to influence Philippine foreign policy and, specifically, decisions that affect the Philippines' participation in the War on Terror and the continued reconstruction of Iraq.

### Endnotes

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- <sup>4</sup> Tyner, James A. 2005. *Iraq, Terror, and the Philippines' Will to War*. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield. In this book I examine the interconnections of international relations, transnational labor migration, military conflict, theology, and terrorism. I concentrate specifically on the decisions surrounding the Philippines' participation in the War on Terror and the reconstruction of Iraq. Special attention is devoted to the events surrounding the capture and release of Filipino worker Angelo de la Cruz.
- <sup>5</sup> Office of the President, "PGMA's Speech during the 103rd Foundation Day of the Department of Foreign Affairs," July 12, 2001, [www.opnet.ops.gov.ph/speech-2001july12.htm](http://www.opnet.ops.gov.ph/speech-2001july12.htm) (August 9, 2004).
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(Continued on Page 32)



# ***Jihadists From Iraq: Future Threats***

## ***Chuck Fahrer, PhD, Department Of History & Geography Georgia College and State University***

### **Introduction**

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the United States and other Western countries joined the Muslim world in supporting the Afghan mujahideen. That support extended to the widespread recruitment of Muslim volunteers, primarily Islamists, who traveled to Afghanistan via Pakistan to fight the Communists. Their jihadist education rested on three pillars: military training in Pakistan, Deobandi or Wahhabi religious instruction at nearby madrasas, and combat experience in Afghanistan. For over two decades, Afghanistan offered a location where militant Islamists could wage jihad rather than watch from afar, fighting first against the Soviets and later in the Afghan civil war.

Although American forces now confront Islamic militants in Afghanistan, Iraq has become the primary destination for Arab jihadists bent on challenging American and other coalition forces. It is difficult to predict the duration of the insurgency in Iraq, but its aftermath may set the stage for a pattern of events similar to those that occurred following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. This article considers future jihadist threats that may emerge as the insurgency in Iraq subsides.

### **Returnees from Afghanistan**

In hindsight, many analysts viewed the recruitment and training of Islamic militants to fight the Soviets as a case of *blowback* due to the failure to look beyond the immediate conflict in Afghanistan, but it took years for that realization to sink in. [1] In Afghanistan and Pakistan, Islamists created jihadist networks and set about exporting the jihad to their home countries. During the 1990s, these so-called *returnees from Afghani-*

*stan* (a.k.a. Arab Afghans or *Afghanis*) took part in Islamist insurgencies as far apart as Algeria, Egypt, Chechnya, Kashmir, and the southern Philippines. As those conflicts ended or decreased in intensity, many surviving insurgents returned to Afghanistan to train with al-Qaeda (the Base), fight for the Taliban, and plan for the future. The offensive by Northern Alliance and American forces following the 9/11 terrorist attacks inflicted heavy casualties on the Taliban and al-Qaeda, leaving the survivors initially adrift without a clear focus for future operations. The US decision to invade Iraq in 2003 solved their dilemma by offering jihadists a new rallying point.

### **Insurgency in Iraq**

The United States and its coalition allies achieved a quick victory in conventional warfare during Operation Iraqi Freedom, but the subsequent insurgency seems to have no end in sight. Insurgents employing a combination of guerrilla and terrorist tactics are particularly active in western Iraq, particularly the Sunni Triangle. Coalition authorities believe the majority of insurgents are Iraqis, but foreign jihadists often inflict greater casualties due to their willingness to employ suicide bombings against military and civilian targets alike. Syria is frequently blamed for lax border controls as well as charges that they facilitate infiltration by Syrian and other foreign jihadists. It has been suggested that Syrian authorities “opened the doors to jihad in Iraq to see who would go, detaining those who made it back alive.” [2] Less criticism is directed at “the Saudi Government, which is . . . opening ‘jihad’ outlets” in Iraq for its own militants. [3] Much of the infiltration occurs in the predominantly Sunni region of western Iraq which borders Syria, Jordan, and

Saudi Arabia (see Figure 1). If Syria and Saudi Arabia are indeed using the Iraqi insurgency as a "safety valve" to reduce internal pressure, then they are playing a dangerous game and one that could result in blowback for the entire region. [4] Not all foreign jihadists will martyr themselves and not all of them will be captured, either in Iraq or elsewhere. If history repeats itself, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and other countries will one day confront the *returnees from Iraq*.

ees from Iraq with the skills and motivation for the next round of conflicts. The jihadist threat will be magnified by new networks established in Iraq. Jihadists may travel individually or in groups to

### Returnees from Iraq

In the United States, *returnee from Iraq* denotes US military veterans of the Iraqi campaigns. In the Middle East, however, the term is often used to describe foreign jihadists who have fought there. To date, the insurgency in Iraq has dominated the jihadists' agenda. The threat area will expand when substantial numbers of jihadists begin to leave Iraq, perhaps intent on widening the conflict just as Chechen militants sought to spark a wider Caucasus conflict. The same combination of military training, religious indoctrination, and combat experience will provide return-

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Iraq where they have the opportunity to forge alliances with like-minded jihadists from their own and neighboring countries (see Figure 2). Those who return home may do so as members of expanded networks capable of conducting more sophisticated operations at the national and international scale.

Over 10,000 volunteers are believed to have taken part in the fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Various Arab and Muslim governments helped to recruit them and veterans could initially return home and openly discuss their exploits against the Soviets. Consequently, the security agencies knew the identities of some returnees who later joined Islamist insurgent movements.

The new generation of jihadists, however, are recruited by militant groups who operate in a clandestine environment. Despite the covert nature of their recruitment, estimates of the number of foreign jihadists in Iraq run as high as 3,000. Mahan Abedin of the Jamestown Foundation put the number of Saudi volunteers alone at approximately 2,000 including several hundred deserters from Saudi Arabia's National Guard. [5]

Tracking and apprehending returning jihadists will be particularly challenging. Ironically,

some Iraqi jihadists have already been in prison, but granting amnesty to political opponents is something of a Middle East tradition. Jordan had Abu Musab al-Zarqawi tucked away in prison until he was released as part of an amnesty. After Anwar Sadat took power in 1970, he granted amnesty to Islamists so they could function as counterweights to Nasserist opponents in the Egyptian

government. Unfortunately for him, some of them were members of militant offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood who were involved in his 1981 assassination. Almost two decades later, Graham Usher observed that Egyptian prisons were where “the innocent become sympathizers and the sympathizers become militants.” [6] That remark could apply to other countries as well and underscores the importance of

preventing prisoner abuse which represents a valuable jihadist recruiting tool. When Syria's Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000, he followed this tradition and granted amnesty to hundreds of Sunni Islamists. [7] Based on the Egyptian example, many can be expected to eschew further opposition to the regime. But some may rejoin militant groups, perhaps volunteering to fight in Iraq as well.

The Syrian government risks radicalization of a dangerous segment of society that is drawn



Figure 1: The Middle East (Source: H.J. de Blij and Peter O. Muller. *Geography: Realms, Regions, and Concepts*, 11e. John Wiley & Sons, 2005).

from its demographic majority. Moreover, that majority has been politically disenfranchised for decades. Algerian and Egyptian experiences with Arab Afghans who fought in insurgencies there underscores the threat to Syria. Michael Doran's observation that "Radical Sunni Islamists hate Shi'ites more than any other group, including Jews and Christians" raises another issue. [8] The horrific violence that plagued Algeria occurred in an overwhelmingly Sunni country. As a heretical offshoot of Shia Islam, the Alawis ruling Syria have added reason to worry about becoming the next target of militant Sunnis when, or




Figure 2: Unaffiliated jihadist groups travel to Iraq (A). While engaged in the jihad there, they establish links with other jihadist groups from their own and neighboring countries (B). Surviving insurgents return home as part of expanded networks that pose greater terrorist threats within those countries (C).

even before, the insurgency in Iraq subsides. Past actions such as the brutal suppression of the 1982 Hama uprising in which over 10,000 civilians perished will certainly be revived by those

seeking to incite Sunnis against the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

Barring a popular uprising, it is unlikely that Sunni militants could seize power in Syria; if they tried they would probably fail. [9] But almost 1,500 people died during Egypt's failed Islamist insurgency, primarily in Upper Egypt. Insurgents accounted for approximately 550 fatalities, but almost 400 security personnel, 100 foreigners, 130 Coptic Christians, and over 200 other Egyptian civilians died as well. [10] Those numbers pale in comparison to Algeria where over 100,000 people perished in another failed insurgency. An unsuccessful insurgency in Syria could cost thousands of lives and exacerbate other conflicts, especially vis-à-vis Israel. Signs of a potential insurgency have already appeared. In April 2005, four people were killed in a firefight between extremists and security forces in Damascus. More recently, Syrian security forces found and destroyed a roadside bomb outside Damascus and later killed two militants during a security raid on their hideout in the capital. A subsequent search of the residence turned up weapons, explosives, and jihadist literature calling for the overthrow of governments throughout the Middle East. [11] The situation in Syria raises a difficult issue for US policymakers. Although the US government certainly disapproves of the Ba'athist regime in Syria, any attempt to induce regime change there might produce blowback conditions favorable for Sunni militants. Stabilization efforts in Iraq are unlikely to benefit from destabilizing Syria.

Spillover into Saudi Arabia poses an even greater threat. Saudi Arabia avoided widespread insurgent violence in the 1990s, but terrorist attacks there have increased since 9/11. Saudis account for the majority of foreign jihadists in Iraq and their return to Saudi Arabia is certainly not going to improve the Kingdom's security situation. [12] One of the greatest dangers is that the jihadists might incite violence against the Shia minority in Saudi Arabia as well as Shia populations in other Persian Gulf. Saudi Shias are concentrated in the oil-rich provinces of eastern Saudi Arabia. A Pakistani-style outbreak of Sunni-Shia

violence in the Persian Gulf could seriously disrupt world oil supplies and create turmoil in world financial markets.

The Maghreb is another source for jihadists, albeit to a lesser extent. Dozens of volunteers from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania, as well as European Maghrebis, have traveled to Iraq to join the jihad. [13] Due to their substantial counterinsurgency experience, the Algerian military may be able to defeat renewed jihadist attempts before they can become a major threat. Additionally, most Algerians remain weary of past violence and wary of its renewal. But the jihadists are not following Mao Zedong's directives for protracted popular war. They are likely to instigate violence with or without substantial popular support. Other Maghreb countries that have not yet experienced a jihadist insurgency may be at even greater risk from the returnees from Iraq and allied jihadists. The June 2005 attack by Algerian-based jihadists on a Mauritanian military installation underscores that threat. The European jihadists pose a special threat should they decide to target member countries of the European Union. Jihadists have carried out attacks in Europe in the past such as the Paris subway bombings in the 1990s and the more recent Madrid bombings. Renewed terrorist attacks could spark a violent reaction from various European ultra-nationalist groups which would further complicate the problem.

The term *returnee from Iraq* describes the foreign jihadists, but not Iraqi jihadists. After Desert Storm, the Iraqi regime forged relations with Wahhabi Islamists to bolster their strength. [14] This accounts for the presence of Iraqi Sunni jihadists among the insurgents, some with advanced military training under Saddam's regime. If the new Iraqi government manages to quell the insurgency, some expatriate Iraqi jihadists will almost certainly attempt to continue the fight elsewhere. Just as some Afghan mujahideen fought in the Kashmir conflict, Iraqi jihadists may one day appear in Syria, Saudi Arabia, and other countries.

## Conclusions

When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, American leaders felt safe to declare victory and ignore the aftermath. It took years before the scope of danger was fully appreciated. If the US-supported Iraqi government brings an end to the insurgency, many jihadists may find the changed circumstances unfavorable and leave Iraq. The United States cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of Afghanistan. The jihadists are not going to "go away" in terms of diminishing danger. If they go away, it will literally mean the migration of the jihadist threat. That threat will be magnified by the jihadists' combat experience and new networks created in Iraq. For jihadists intent on attacking American personnel in the Middle East, a reduction of US troops in Iraq may signal a shift to attacks on US personnel in other Persian Gulf countries rather than a reduction in attacks altogether. American military personnel stationed throughout the region must therefore remain vigilant to this increasing threat even as they continue searching for solutions to the current conflict.

## Endnotes

1. Although blowback is associated with a weapons malfunction, it became a CIA slang term in the 1950s for operations that produce unexpected repercussions.
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# *The Kingdom of Nepal: “A Yam between Two Boulders”<sup>1</sup>*

*by MAJ Randy Koolmous,*

This paper presents the history and politics of Nepal to allow the reader to better understand the Maoist insurgency that currently threatens Nepal's very existence. While my intent is to provide the little-known background information that one normally doesn't find in the press, I purposely avoid making recommendations or predictions for the future.

It has only been since the partition of British India in 1947 that Nepal established relations with the outside world. Previously, Nepal existed in self-imposed isolation. Even within the country the population rarely traveled based on the lack of roads, the harsh Himalayan terrain of the north and the particularly virulent strain of malaria in the southern Terai plains.<sup>2</sup> Though never occupied by a foreign power, poor governance and tyranny existed via Nepal's own rulers without the colonial benefits of an education system, medicine, road building and communications.<sup>3</sup> The era of hereditary Prime Ministers continued until 1951, and an absolute monarchy existed until 1990. Democracy debuted just 15 years ago and the Nepalese people will require a couple of generations in order to embrace the new idea of democracy and overcome the inertia of the divine right of kings as the only legitimate form of government. The big assumption here is that the Maoist insurgency will fail and a Kingdom of Nepal will exist for these future generations.

## **Contemporary Nepal**

Ineffective government actions to date have politically crippled Nepal with declining tourism and other revenue sources due to the insurgency economically impeding national development. However, positive change is occurring as Nepali society tries to overcome the social order of the feudal days. The World Bank reports an 11% de-

cline in poverty over the last eight years based on increased foreign remittances from the 1 in 11 Nepali males employed abroad. Construction is ongoing in Kathmandu to meet greater housing demands and city streets continue to be improved. However, that's Kathmandu; Nepal itself is among the poorest and least developed countries in the world with 42% of its population living below the poverty line. Average annual income ranges from a \$220 country average to under \$100 in the western district and Maoist stronghold of Rolpa. Sixty ethnic and class groups exist in Nepal with three being politically and economically dominant; 98% of Nepal's civil servants are from just two groups representing just 29% of the population.<sup>4</sup> While some reports estimate a decline of up to 70% in business activities in Kathmandu due to the insurgency, all political and economic power remains within the Kathmandu Valley, which many citizens consider to comprise the extent of Nepal. Outside the valley, the uneven distribution of income and wealth is astronomical and growing, and large tracts of fallow land exist in western Nepal due to mass migrations out of conflict areas.<sup>5</sup> Apathy is rampant within the Nepali population that is beaten down and seeks peace at any cost.

## **The Maoist Insurgency**

The historical legacy of rulers pursuing their own personal gains opposed to the needs of the people is one of the driving forces behind the Maoist insurgency that today threatens the very existence of Nepal.<sup>6</sup> Maoist appeal lies with a general population that perceives itself as poorly served by their government and preyed on by officials.<sup>7</sup> The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN(M)), a US-designated terrorist group via Executive Order 13224 of 2003 regarding terrorist property and the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL) of

2004 banning immigration, has been waging an armed insurgency since 1996 to replace the Nepalese monarchy with a single party dictatorship followed by the collectivization of agriculture, elimination of class enemies, exporting the revolution and eventually placing the hammer and sickle on top of Sagarmatha (Mt. Everest). While the list of contributory factors and roots of the Maoist revolt itself would fill volumes, the majority of the Maoist heartland known as the 'Red Zone' exists in Rukum and Rolpa districts of western Nepal, a heavily forested, mountainous area smaller than Rhode Island.<sup>8</sup>

After withdrawing from peace talks in November 2001, the Maoists attacked Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) bases and managed to overrun some RNA positions and recover weapons. Although the Maoists lack State sponsorship, a 1,700 KM porous border with India simplifies logistical support and coordination between the Maoists and insurgent groups in India. The Maoists increasingly criticize both the United States and Government of India's economic and military support for the Government of Nepal (GON), to include an attack against the American Center in Kathmandu in September 2004.<sup>9</sup> Maoists routinely commit horrendous atrocities as a matter of policy, and Nepal would likely parallel Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge if the Maoists came to power.

### **The Royal Family**

For centuries the Shah family ruled Gorkha, a hill state west of Kathmandu.<sup>10</sup> From 1744 onward, these 'Gorkhas' gradually encircled their enemies in the Kathmandu valley. In 1767 the British East India Company sent 2,400 British and Indian troops against the Gorkhas, from which only a third left Nepal alive due to malaria and mountain ambushes. By 1769 Prithvi Narayan Shah had become the undisputed ruler of Nepal and the House of Gorkha controlled much of present-day central and eastern Nepal. However, Sikhs prevented further western expansion and

the King avoided the British on the Indian plains to the south and east. The Gorkha's superiority in hill fighting could not match the massed British cannons and cavalry, proven during the Anglo-Nepalese war from 1814-1816, ultimately lost by Nepal. To avoid rival heirs dividing up the kingdom upon his death, the king ordained the strict observance of primogeniture meaning male, legitimate and of pure lineage heirs being the future rulers.<sup>11</sup> Multiple wives and concubines obviously complicated this process, with some of the Shah family's greatest tragedies resulting from junior queens wishing to install their sons on the throne.

### **The Hereditary Prime Ministers**

By the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century, Nepal had a dual system of government with all-powerful Ministers from the Rana family in charge and the Shah Kings reigning as mere figureheads. As with the monarchy, appointment as the hereditary Prime Minister was also by strict rules of succession. The Ranas grew rich as no distinction between public and personal finances existed. Like the Shahs, the Rana's practice of polygamy to extreme levels required further revision to the rolls of succession.<sup>12</sup> Also, feeble, weak-willed and frivolous Kings that intermarried with the Ranas were far less likely to try to reclaim their rightful authority.

Post partition, newly democratic India resented that the Ranas prohibited Nepal from following the same route. Prime Minister Nehru decided to help the Shahs escape their Rana imprisonment by allowing them to seek asylum within the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu and eventually New Delhi. Once the Shahs successfully escaped, the Ranas placed three-year old Prince Gyanendra on the throne as the Shahs had left him behind in Nepal. After the international community refused to recognize the new government, the Shahs eventually reclaimed their throne and today King Gyanendra once again rules Nepal.

### The Aftermath of Regicide

On June 1<sup>st</sup> 2001 Crown Prince Dipendra shot and killed the majority of the Nepali royal family. Most accounts blame the palace massacre on the conflict between the Queen and the Crown Prince over whom he should marry. Confusion and panic existed immediately after the shootings as the King of Nepal stands above the law and cannot be investigated nor prosecuted. Even though in a coma himself from being shot, Prince Dipendra legally became King. No investigation of the new King Dipendra's killing of his father King Birendra, his mother Queen Aishwarya and many other members of the royal family could proceed because no provision exists in the constitution for anyone to intervene in royal household affairs. Upon his death three days later, Dipendra's body was cremated per Hindu ritual without the benefit of an autopsy.<sup>13</sup>

The deaths of both Kings Birendra and Dipendra returned Gyanendra, Birendra's younger brother, to the throne. In October 2002, the new King Gyanendra dismissed the Prime Minister after the PM dissolved the parliament but failed to hold elections. Subsequently the King reinstated the same PM in 2004. On February 1<sup>st</sup> 2005 the King removed the Prime Minister and took over as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, with a commitment to the return to democracy within three years. The King ended the emergency on April 27, 2005 and has pledged to hold elections.

### Nepali Security Forces

The Royal Nepalese Army (RNA), Armed Police Force (APF) and a small portion of the Nepal Civil Police comprise Nepalese security forces under RNA unified command.<sup>14</sup> The 85,000 strong RNA is roughly equivalent in organization to a US Army Corps comprised primarily of light infantry with supporting arms arrayed across Nepal in strongpoint defenses in the 75 district capi-

tals.<sup>15</sup> The Government of Nepal created the paramilitary APF in 2001 to provide an armed and trained police force to fight the Maoists. Politically the APF was to serve as the civilian government's counter to the RNA, which politicians perceived as only supporting the King.

A power vacuum has existed in the countryside since mid-2000 when the Nepal police began closing outposts and consolidating forces into larger police stations for better defense against Maoist attacks.<sup>16</sup> Police presence is non-existent in most rural areas today, so by default the RNA is normally the only government presence existing outside the major cities. The security forces have been increasingly successful against the Maoists during recent actions, though the insurgents are far from being a defeated force. As insurgencies don't have purely military solutions, and success of government security forces does not equate to automatic success by the Government of Nepal.

Nepal became a member of the United Nations in 1955, and first provided military observers in the Middle-East with UNOGIL in 1958. To date Nepal has provided 46,000 persons to 29 missions around the world. Among the 102 troop contributing countries, the top four contributors are from South Asia and Nepal ranks fourth with a total of 3,451 peacekeeping troops, monitors and civilian police currently serving on UN missions, while concurrently fighting a growing Maoist insurgency within Nepal.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> In the words of the first modern-era Nepali King Prithvi Narayan Shah during the 18<sup>th</sup> century, "Nepal exists as a yam between two boulders." This statement holds true today regarding Nepal's physical and political location between India and China.

<sup>2</sup> Bista, Dor Bahadur, *People of Nepal*, Ratna Pustak Bhandar, Kathmandu, 2004, pg. XIX.

<sup>3</sup> Gregson, Johnathan, *Blood Against the Snows-The Tragic Story of Nepal's royal Dynasty*, Fourth Estate, London, 2003, pg. 19.

<sup>4</sup> Thapa, pg. 64. The population of Nepal is approximately 26.5 million (2003). Nepalese consist of Brahmin, Chhetri,

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# ***The Role of Military-to-Military Relationships in the Development of a New Intelligence Architecture***

***by LT Manuel A. Orellana Jr., USN***

## **Introduction**

Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, much attention has been paid to the failure by military leaders to discard their conventional, Cold War mentality. Along with thousands of analysts from the US intelligence community at large, most military intelligence professionals did not properly recognize the eviction of the Iraqi army from Kuwait as the engagement of an enemy in a new and adverse area of operations. Many US intelligence personnel missed the opportunity to redevelop their focus, redefine their professional culture, and reorganize the intelligence community in preparation for new and unconventional threats. Ten years later, the intelligence community was caught unprepared, like the majority of American military leadership, and forced to reap the consequences of operating in a conventional warfare paradigm. Following the attacks of 2001, extensive efforts have been made to critically analyze recent US intelligence shortfalls and dutifully document the dire need for appropriate reform. Having determined *what* is wrong with the US intelligence community, policy and decision makers have also proceeded to tell administration officials and military leaders *how* to fix it. It is unfortunate however, that the ongoing global war on terror waits for no one. Although one does not deny the need for intelligence reform, changes and improvements to current US intelligence capabilities need to occur now.

For purposes of this article, an intelligence architecture is defined as an organized intelligence apparatus, a structured environment in

which intelligence disciplines, capabilities, and procedures are deployed in support of selected civilian and/or military requirements. The decision to anchor US intelligence architectures to technological means following the collapse of the Soviet Union stifled the expansion of the indigenous, tactical level intelligence capability that is needed today. According to Lt. Col. Lester W. Grau, "the military intelligence effort devoted to combating [Iraqi insurgency movements] has little in common with conventional intelligence operations in support of conventional maneuver war."<sup>1</sup> Case studies of the civil war in El Salvador, the battle against insurgent forces in Colombia, the war in Iraq, and US combat operations in Afghanistan conducted in support of this article make it evident that conventional, top-down intelligence architectures, although capable of supporting the conventional fight, have fallen short against asymmetric threats.<sup>2</sup> In the following paragraphs, the need for a new intelligence architecture is defined and put forth based on the emergence of enemies that are proficient in unconventional tactics and operate in previously unknown battlespaces. In addition, the value of establishing new intelligence architectures by way of military-to-military relations is presented as one way to improve current and future intelligence efforts, support military operations, and further American foreign policy.

## **The Arenas of Current and Future Conflict**

It is very difficult, and some analysts say even impossible, to identify with certainty the type and variety of threats that will challenge the

United States in the future.<sup>3</sup> However, it is certain that the manner in which US military and intelligence entities organize and plan for the challenges of the future will fail if decision makers prepare by reconstituting previous conventional battles. Areas of current and future conflict as they are described below, are meant only to provide a sample of the numerous environments and challenges that the US intelligence community is facing and will continue to face in the future. It is proposed that a general portrayal of current and future battlespaces and a subsequent discussion of how to build a new intelligence architecture is necessary to identify the procedures and protagonists needed to optimize US intelligence support in the future.

### ***State and Non-State Sponsors of Terrorism***

In the weeks following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States, the administration of President George W. Bush made it clear that in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the existence of terrorist organizations was facilitated by the logistical, ideological, and financial support provided by willing state sponsors and allowed by countries incapable of eradicating terrorism within their borders. The US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism directly correlates the reduction of terrorist scope and capabilities to the need to locate and destroy foreign sanctuaries.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, within American policy efforts to “deny, defeat, diminish, and defend” against terrorism, the verb deny refers to US efforts to stop state sponsorship and terrorist sanctuaries on a global scale. However, US measures to halt state sponsorship currently revolve around largely military, financial, and political alliances with affected countries. Current American policies against state sponsorship are vulnerable because they do not engage citizens living among terrorist elements in sanctuary countries. The United States must go beyond an impersonal policy of financial payments and dip-

lomatic rhetoric and focus on ways to empower the inhabitants of state sponsor territories to voluntarily reject their state’s sponsorship of terror.

### **Home Grown Insurgencies**

In the words of RAND analyst Bruce Hoffman, the inability of US political and military planners to prepare for operations following the fall of Baghdad reflected “the [US] failure not only to recognize the incipient conditions for insurgencies, but also ignore its nascent manifestations and arrest its growth before it is able to gain initial traction and in turn momentum.”<sup>5</sup> In addition to the demonstrated complexity and multi-dimensional aspects of an insurgency movement, the intelligence required to prepare for counterinsurgency situations must be collected using comprehensive intelligence architectures. According to General Rene Emilio Ponce, the defense minister at the height of the civil war in El Salvador (1979-1992), “90 percent of counterinsurgency is political, social, economic and ideological and only 10 percent military.”<sup>6</sup> To date, combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed the US military’s limited cultural awareness and its difficulty in containing a decentralized insurgent movement; facts that will undoubtedly encourage many US adversaries to develop or improve similar asymmetric capabilities. In order to defeat insurgencies in areas of future conflict, military intelligence assets must be operating *on the ground* long before the commencement of hostilities. The proactive development by intelligence professionals of the cultural, social, political, and military baselines determined critical in El Salvador but ignored in Iraq can not only identify the precursors of an insurgency, but also assist in the development of appropriate courses of action from the tactical to the strategic level.

### **Nation Building Abroad**

A review of the missions conducted by US forces in Haiti, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq can quickly illustrate the wide breadth of intelli-

gence expertise and assistance necessary in any nation building effort. Since the fall of the Taliban regime, US forces and their respective intelligence units have been involved in missions to support humanitarian relief, assist in provincial reconstruction, establish civil affair programs and apprehend High Value Targets (HVTs). In an effort to receive and act on intelligence within hours of its collection, US forces have been stationed in Afghan villages for extended periods of time, thereby “becoming a more permanent, familiar presence.”<sup>7</sup> Although efforts to establish a positive relationship with a native population take time and may not be completely intelligence dependent, parallel efforts to pursue dynamic military objectives within a nation building environment constantly demand the swift analysis and dissemination of actionable intelligence. In Iraq, deployed US Marine units have also been positioning themselves among the population in their areas of operation whenever possible, in order to “live and work with the Iraqi Police and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC).”<sup>8</sup> If current and future US nation building efforts are to continue, they must do so with the realization that human beings are key terrain and the conduits of transnational and transcultural issues. Likewise, intelligence professionals in current and future nation building environments must be ready to respond with both time and culturally sensitive analysis, and just as importantly, have the capability to fuse and disseminate the intelligence quickly and correctly.

### **The Maritime Threat**

US Navy initiatives to recognize and reduce vulnerabilities to US military units deployed overseas, along with the ongoing execution of maritime and leadership interdiction operations (MIO/LIO) at sea, require the fusion and timely dissemination of intelligence to multinational allies. Moreover, US personnel operating within this global maritime environment must now possess a knowledge of vessels, cargo, crews, and passengers that extends well beyond traditional maritime boundaries.<sup>9</sup> Intelligence efforts in this setting

frequently depend on native language speakers, language interpreters and detailed, historical databases. US military and intelligence agencies operating in this maritime domain have been augmented through the extensive participation of coalition partners, resulting in an increased opportunity to cooperate and share intelligence in support of counter-terrorism, force protection, homeland security, freedom of navigation and counter-narcotic operations. From the Horn of Africa to Central Asia, embarked multinational forces have drawn on US and allied intelligence sources to impede the smuggling of oil from Iraq, deter the escape of terrorists from Afghanistan, and clear countless mines from the Arabian Gulf.<sup>10</sup> Today and in the future, afloat and ashore US intelligence support elements will be required to surmount technological and linguistic barriers to support a wide variety of maritime missions. These commitments will range from humanitarian, to law enforcement, to military operations and involve the defense of US personnel and property at home and abroad.

### **A Need for a New Intelligence Architecture**

Independent of time and geographical space, maritime and shore-based scenarios similar to the ones mentioned above must be counted upon to test the very limits of US intelligence capabilities. Therefore, as new adversaries rise to challenge the US military’s way of war, intelligence professionals must find more efficient and effective ways of supporting a demanding operational tempo. During a time of unprecedented demands on the US intelligence community, conventional architectures will find it difficult to contend with increasingly complex intelligence requirements because national security no longer depends on stalking one enemy- the Soviet Union. With the return of decentralized enemies, the development of an intelligence architecture that fosters the production and dissemination of intelligence at the tactical level, where US forces are in contact with the enemy, instead of emphasizing

support from distant and strategic-level intelligence factories is paramount. Furthermore, the deferral of bureaucratic intelligence requirements until *after* indigenous intelligence architectures are in place can allow US intelligence professionals to gain critical background knowledge and expertise prior to a demand for combat support.

Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have provided the United States with documented proof of the value of human intelligence (HUMINT), and the important balance that must be struck between HUMINT and technical intelligence means within current and future intelligence architectures. The continued dependence on a technology-based intelligence infrastructure is complicated by the sparse conditions of future areas of conflict and the need for long-term cultural, social, and religious immersion. According to Professor Kalev Sepp, a visit to Iraq in November of 2004 revealed the absence of American intelligence capabilities that acknowledged tribalism, transnational influences, and the multiple layers of an insurgent threat.<sup>11</sup> In today's world, intelligence is mud [ground] to space.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, the US intelligence community must stop building detached intelligence architectures from space down to tactical units on the ground. In order for the US intelligence community to stop being reactive in a combat environment, it must develop an ability to consistently produce actionable intelligence from the battleground-up, disseminate it through the lowest and most appropriate authority possible, and support both military and political decision-makers.

What would or should, this new "mud to space" intelligence architecture look like? The following section proposes a model for a new intelligence architecture in an effort to maintain the US intelligence community several steps ahead of future conflicts and more importantly, increase its ability to provide short and long term support to a wide variety of potential missions.

## How to Build a New Intelligence Architecture

Building a new intelligence architecture that can meet current and future threats goes beyond efforts to expand America's HUMINT capability, increase the number of US Army Special Forces, or reorganize the structure of the US intelligence community. Building a new intelligence architecture requires the development of a proactive and open-minded approach towards new areas of intelligence such as civil affairs, counterinsurgency methods, and information operations. The US intelligence community must develop intelligence architectures that reside within areas of future conflict to collaborate with competing multinational interests, nullify future threats and analyze, instead of report, events. The thorough social-political understanding necessary to produce intelligence overseas has been complicated by an ignorance of cultural issues, language barriers, a difficulty accessing the populace, and the lack of vetted intelligence sources. Based on a growing movement by the United States to mount an active defense against foreign enemies in the GWOT, areas of future conflict should be expected to offer similar or even greater cultural challenges.

US intelligence architectures designed to fight emerging and prospective threats must be staffed and managed appropriately in order to produce useful intelligence. A need to fuse and disseminate specialized intelligence quickly while informing decision-makers at the tactical, operational, and strategic level, demands the participation of regional experts and coalition partners that possess the necessary cultural background and experience. In addition, new intelligence architectures must be:

- Tailored to support dynamic action within the United States or abroad simultaneously. The fluid organizational structure of current and future enemies demands that intelligence analy-

sis compete with the 24-hour news cycle. Moreover, intelligence products must evolve and be refined continuously and quickly, upon an international stage. Intelligence products must be tailored to support broad as well as specific domestic and foreign policies, and defeat a transnational enemy that is no longer tied down by nationality or large orders of battle.

- Geared to perform target development and analysis with greater detail, on multiple levels, and in collaboration with different intelligence disciplines. Terrorists are currently operating in decentralized groups and their ability to move and operate within multiple territories and populated areas can create dynamic targets of opportunity in a matter of minutes. This type of elusive targeting will require the sharing of US intelligence with other countries to conduct and fuse information quickly, mitigate political concerns, and prevent unnecessary physical damage.
- Aware that although timely and accurate intelligence is a necessary condition to defeat asymmetric threats, it is not a substitute for sound military planning that is based on known force capabilities instead of supposed enemy threats. In cases when military institutions may be inclined to fight unconventional enemies using attrition tactics that focus on internal administration, logistics, and operations, new intelligence architectures must recognize an enemy's unconventional capabilities and be prepared to support relational maneuver warfare which focuses on reconfiguring capabilities, manipulating social conditions, and exposing enemy weaknesses.<sup>13</sup>
- Prepared to provide intelligence support that facilitates the efficient and effective use of special operations forces. In addition to providing the intelligence necessary to allow special operation forces to deceive and surprise the enemy, intelligence architectures must recognize that special operations are accomplished with the smallest number of personnel possible, and are dependent on thorough intelligence support to simplify mission tasks and objectives.
- Staffed with US personnel that are trained to disseminate intelligence products to foreign military and civilian entities and embrace the unconventional methods needed to fight terrorism. The US intelligence community can help improve the level of protection for US troops on the ground and increase the relevance of intelligence products by training to work with indigenous forces. These forces possess valuable cultural knowledge and can be supported with the intelligence needed to carry out critical civil affairs missions. Producing specific intelligence products to *maintain* the peace is now as important as producing the intelligence products needed to triumph in war.
- Capable of producing intelligence products that are accessible by not only US and allied forces, but also available to new, non-state customers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Future threats to national security will originate from multiple regions, failing states, and non-states because most of the people who threaten the American way of life plan, train, and operate in countries other than their own. Proper and timely dissemination of intelligence products to familiar coalition partners as well as unfamiliar governments will be essential.

Based on an established need by the US intelligence community to redevelop its focus and introduce an intelligence architecture capable of fighting complicated and multinational threats, military-to-military relations between US and host nation personnel will be examined in the following section, and proposed as a key ingredient in future intelligence architectures. The analysis of US involvement in El Salvador, Colombia, Afghanistan and Iraq performed in support of this argu-

ment demonstrates that in time, military-to-military ties can provide US forces with the background and experience necessary to establish and maintain a superior intelligence architecture abroad.

### **One Solution: The Use of Military to Military Relations in a New Intelligence Architecture**

Without effective intelligence on current and future adversaries, the United States will have a difficult time recognizing the threats it is facing, and even less opportunities to focus the resources needed to combat and defeat the enemy. Readers should look no further than the US failure to build a coalition with the government of Sudan, based on the Sudanese offer to allow the extradition of Usama Bin Laden in 1996, as an example of the critical need by the US government and intelligence personnel to understand the language, history, politics, and culture of the area in which they work.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, having established the need for a new intelligence architecture based on diffuse threats and elusive enemies, the use of military-to-military relations is proposed as a way to guide the United States into enhanced intelligence efforts, important multilateral operations, and the empowerment of allies in the war against terrorism.

Anyone considering the use of military-to-military relations as a vehicle to increased intelligence capabilities must first be warned. A review of available research reveals that these relationships, although capable of improving intelligence efforts, require a long-term investment of trained and experienced personnel, professional as well as personal patience, honesty, and rarely offer immediate gains. In El Salvador and Colombia, military-to-military relations, although initially difficult, proved to be fertile ground for the establishment of intelligence sharing agreements after several years. Moreover, these relations eventually supported US regional policy objectives and

increased the counterinsurgency capabilities of the indigenous military forces. In Afghanistan, the participation of indigenous Northern Alliance forces provided the indigenous forces needed by US Special Operations Forces to conduct efficient ground maneuvers and call for well-directed fires against the enemy.<sup>15</sup>

Two years after the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq remains an example of the consequences resulting from the absence of military relations between members of the US-led cooperative and compliant Iraqi forces. Instructions given by the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to dissolve the Iraqi military infrastructure prevented US forces from fully incorporating newly trained Iraqi security forces into a comprehensive, long-term national security system.<sup>16</sup> Meanwhile, the unsupervised introduction of coalition forces into the Iraqi tribal balance of power after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime markedly upset native social-political patterns and irrevocably altered the security environment.<sup>17</sup> In the post-Saddam era, US forces have been able to develop and maintain military-to-military ties with experienced and trustworthy Iraqi military personnel with mixed results. Arguably, the absence of a military-to-military relationship in Iraq following the fall of Baghdad proved to be yet another lost opportunity for US forces in desperate need of greater situational awareness and better insight into complex social, political and tribal systems.

Nonetheless, the Global War on Terrorism continues to be fought in socially and politically compromised countries similar to those found in the Middle East and Latin America, possessing inconsistent state, financial and military resources. Most of the countries in these regions are unprepared or incapable of effectively waging counterinsurgency or counterterrorism efforts, which under optimal circumstances, require extended periods of training and preparation. Proactive US efforts to seek out areas of future conflict in order to establish military-to-military rela-

tions can help US analysts identify key indicators of unrest, target the person or persons that threaten a peaceful way of life, and select appropriate courses of action prior to, or instead of, the onset of hostilities. Military-to military relations can help US forces in their need to expand their linguistic capabilities, develop necessary databases, and effectively participate with current and future coalition partners. Dedicated military ties in the form of an intelligence sharing agreement, a joint intelligence center, or an advisory program can help the US intelligence community establish local, ground to space intelligence networks that offer host nations increased intelligence capabilities in exchange for much needed regional expertise. In fact, the use of military to military relationships can guide the US intelligence community back to that overlooked but essential request to redevelop its focus.

### Conclusion

The enclosed recommendations may seem intuitive and may, in one way or another, be already in place. However, over two years after the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, US news outlets continue to report that attacks against US troops deployed overseas occur on a daily basis. These terrorist acts should be seen as the successful culmination of the enemy's plans and therefore, demand the implementation of more effective means in order to stop them. In this age of globalization, events such as commodity smuggling, terror sponsorship, insurgency movements, and humanitarian catastrophes are not just a host nation or state problem. The development of new intelligence architectures and the use of military-to-military relations can enable partner nations, nullify future threats through the use of proactive instead of reactive efforts, and will do more than paint a visually pleasing picture of the area of operations; it will prevent the enemy from eventually defining the global battlespace.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Grau, L.W. (2004 July-August). Something Old, Something New: Guerrillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence Analysis. *Military Review*, 43.

<sup>2</sup> Asymmetric is defined by John T. Chenery, author of "Transnational Threats 101: Today's Asymmetric Battlefield," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, (Jul-Sep 1999):2, as "any unconventional or inexpensive method or means used to avoid [US] our strengths, and exploit our vulnerabilities."

<sup>3</sup> This statement is based on the author's professional experiences during seven years of work in multiple strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence assignments.

<sup>4</sup> National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, 11.

<sup>5</sup> Hoffman, B. (2004). *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 3.

<sup>6</sup> Schwarz, B. C. (1991). *American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 22.

<sup>7</sup> Hoffman, B. (2004). *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 8.

<sup>8</sup> Ricks, T. E. "Marines to Offer New Tactics in Iraq: Reduced Use of Force Planned After Takeover from Army," *Washington Post*, 7 January, 2004.

<sup>9</sup> The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. "Hearing on Maritime Domain Awareness." 6 October 2004. Transcript on-line. Available from <http://www.house.gov/transportation/cgmt/10-06-04/10-06-04r>; Internet; accessed 11 February 2005.

<sup>10</sup> Lecture address by ADM. Walter F. Doran, Commander US Pacific Fleet, 9 September 2003, 18<sup>th</sup> Asialink Conference, Melbourne, Australia. Transcript on-line. Available from <http://www.cpf.navy.mil/speech/speeches/030909.html> Internet; accessed 11 February 2005.

<sup>11</sup> Kalev Sepp, interview with the author, Monterey, California, 12 January 2005. Dr. Sepp is currently a faculty member of the Special Operations Low Intensity Conflict Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School.

<sup>12</sup> USAIC & FH, Six Things Every "2" Must Do, *The Intelligence Officer's Battlebook: Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned*. 26 June 2003. Chapter 1, p.13.

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<sup>9</sup> Woodiwiss, Anthony. 1998. *Globalisation, Human Rights, and Labour Law in Pacific Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 2, 102.

<sup>10</sup> Ma. Theresa Torres, "Bush OK's Stronger RP-US Military Ties," *Manila Times*, May 21, 2003, [www.manilatimes.net/national/2003/may/21/top\\_stories/20030521top1.html](http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2003/may/21/top_stories/20030521top1.html) (March 26, 2004).

<sup>11</sup> Established in 1969 in response to a call for Islamic solidarity by the late Saudi king Faisal I n Abdullaziz, the OIC has a goal of strengthening cooperation among Islamic states in various political, economic, social, and cultural endeavors. With a current membership of 57 states, the OIC has as its aims, the promotion of international peace and security founded on the basis of justice; the protection of holy places of Islam; and the support of the Palestinian peoples. The attendance of Macapagal-Arroyo in 2003 was the first time in the thirty-four year history of the OIC that a Philippine president had been invited. Symbolically, and materially, her visit was important to the on-going peace process of the southern Philippines, the establishment of regional alliances with neighboring Asian states, and as a sign of Asian solidarity. As such it addressed both Macapagal-Arroyo's Catholic beliefs as well as Three of her eight realities of foreign policy.

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[www.jamestown.org/events.php](http://www.jamestown.org/events.php) (accessed on 30 May 2005).

6. Usher, Graham. "Background to a Massacre: Luxor, the Jama'at and Egypt's Prisons." *Middle East International*, No. 573 (24 April 1998), 18.

7. Saddam Hussein granted amnesty to tens of thousands of prisoners prior to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, but his release primarily involved criminals. Political opponents, especially Shia Islamists, were more likely to be executed.

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10. Fahrner, Chuck. "The Geography of Egypt's Islamist Insurgency." *The Arab World Geographer*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn 2001), 168.

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12. Glasser, Susan B. "'Martyrs' in Iraq Mostly Saudis." *Washington Post* (15 May 2005), 1. The report suggests over 50 percent of foreign jihadists come from Saudi Arabia.

13. Rachidi, Ilhem. "Answering the Call for Jihad." *Asia Times Online* (21 May 2005), <http://www.atimes.com> (accessed 21 May 2005).

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<sup>14</sup> Gellman, B. (2001, October 3) U.S. Was Foiled Multiple Times in Efforts To Capture Bin Laden or Have Him Killed; Sudan's Offer to Arrest Militant Fell Through After Saudis Said No; [FINAL Edition], A1. Retrieved February 15, 2005, <http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/82945140.html>. Grau, L.W. (2004 July-August). Something Old, Something New: Guerrillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence Analysis. *Military Review*, 44.

<sup>15</sup> Biddle, S. (2002). *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy*. Strategic Studies Institute. Pennsylvania: US Army War College, viii.

<sup>16</sup> McCallister, W.S. (2003 February). *Integrated Security System: Requirement for a Well Reasoned Tribal Policy*, 20. Paper forwarded by COL David S. Maxwell, USA, SF.

<sup>17</sup> McCallister, W.S. (2003 February). *Integrated Security System: Requirement for a Well Reasoned Tribal Policy*, 7. Paper forwarded by COL David S. Maxwell, USA, SF.



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Newar, Gurung, Magar, Tamang, Rai, Limbu, Sherpa, Tharu, and other ethnic groups. Nepalis are 86.2% Hindu, 7.8% Buddhist and 3.8% Muslim and Nepal is the only official Hindu state in the world.

<sup>5</sup> Thapa, pg. 142.

<sup>6</sup> Thapa, pg. 13.

<sup>7</sup> Thapa, Deepak, A Kingdom Under Siege-Nepal's Maoists Insurgency, 1996-2004, The Printhouse, Kathmandu, 2004, pg. 58. Virtually everyone in western Nepal has been poor for generations and barely manages to survive. As such, foreign assistance plays an important role in development with the international community funding more than 60% of Nepal's development budget and more than 28% of budgetary expenditures.

<sup>8</sup> Gersony, Robert; Sowing the Wind...History and Dynamics of the Maoist Revolt in Nepal's Rapti Hills; report submitted to Mercy Corps International; October 2003, pg 7. Origins of the insurgency are normally attributed to the Government of Nepal's prohibiting of the production, sale and distribution of hashish, the main source for cash income for the area, and the ensuing drop in standard of living. This event was just one of the many deeply embedded local grievances. Today not a single motorable road serves the Red Zone, and until 2003 not a single road existed in Rukum district. Only 10% of this land is arable. Both the fractured terrain and lack of road access made this area advantageous for a rural insurgency.

<sup>9</sup> Two improvised explosive devices detonated on the compound but caused no casualties.

<sup>10</sup> The British have recruited men for their Gurkha regiments from this and other areas since 1816 via the treaty of Sugauli, and after Partition British Gurkhas units were divided between the British Army and Indian Army. Both nations today continue the practice of recruiting Nepali soldiers.

<sup>11</sup> Contemporary Nepalese people revere their King as a reincarnation of the Hindu god Vishnu, to be worshipped and obeyed without question. Similarly, the mystery of the Nepalese King in a forbidden palace parallels the emperors of China and Japan. Gregson, pg. 218.

<sup>12</sup> Children of husband and wife of equal ranking castes equated 'A class,' those of different castes equated 'B class' and low caste were of 'C class;' only A class Ranas could rise above the military rank of Colonel. Gregson, pg. 83.

<sup>13</sup> Many people assume that Dipendra's use of narcotics guided his actions that June day.

<sup>14</sup> The King is the Supreme Commander of the RNA while the Prime Minister normally serves as Minister of Defense.

<sup>15</sup> The world famous Gurkha forces are not synonymous with the RNA; although of the same ethnic stock, approximately 3,400 Nepalese Gurkhas currently serve in the British Army and 40,000 serve in the Indian Army.

<sup>16</sup> Thapa, pg. 106. Many of the district capitals are located on hard to defend terrain.

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**The U.S. Navy is reinvigorating its FAO program.**

Details can be found at:

The link to the Bureau of Personnel page:

<http://www.npc.navy.mil/Officer/MajorStaffPlacement/FAO+Information.htm>

On the right is a series of links in red to the directives and a PowerPoint slide deck relating what the Navy is doing.

## **USMC FAO Notes**

**Maj Mike Oppenheim, International Affairs Officer  
Program Coordinator**



The Marine Corps FAO program has been very active. A China FAO departed for Beijing to commence his ICT. An India FAO and his family will shortly depart for his ICT based in New Delhi at the end of August. One Russia FAO is finishing up in Moscow, and the new Russia FAO is just beginning his ICT. Another Mid-East/North Africa FAO, whose original ICT was preempted by the demands of the force in support of OIF, has resumed his ICT where his language training left off--he and his family and arrived in Cairo to begin his ICT in July. A Sub-Sahara Africa FAO and his wife have kicked off their Sub-Saharan ICT. A China FAO and his wife are enroute to Australia for duty as the Marine Attaché. A Korea FAO completed his ICT, and is en route to his next command for a tour in the Operating Force in his Primary Military Occupational Specialty, and following that tour, will be assigned a FAO utilization tour. An East Asia FAO in Indonesia remains on schedule to graduate from the Indonesian Command and Staff Course in October, and then extend an additional 6 months to commence his ICT.

The FY 06 FAO and RAO Study Track released the names of 10 FAOs and 8 RAOs to begin training at NPS this January 2006. The FAO and RAO Experience Track Board selected 3 additional FAOs (Western Europe, East Asia, and PRC), and a Middle East RAO.

LtCol John May (China FAO) turned over the Marine Corps International Affairs Officer Program (IAOP) Coordinator's position with Maj Mike Oppenheim (another China FAO), to LtCol May will take on duties at the POMDFLI.

On the administrative front, the Marine Corps has been refining its FAO Action Plan,

which includes efforts at soliciting commanders' re-assessment and identification of additional FAO billets spread out across the Marine Expeditionary Forces and Higher Headquarters.

Quite a few additional working groups have been convened as well, both within the Department of the Navy, and joint-wide, addressing the DoD's Defense Language Transformation Roadmap.

The Marine Corps continues to develop its Center of for Advanced Operational Culture and Learning Center (COACLCAOCL), as well as refine its Foreign Military Training Unit's regime, having recently solicited Middle Eastern and Sub-Saharan FAOs in the national capital region (NCR) to lend their expertise and assist in course curriculum development.

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
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