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PURPOSE: To publish a journal for disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information that will promote understanding between U.S. regional specialists around the world and improve their effectiveness in advising decision-makers. It is intended to forge a closer bond between the active, reserve, and retired FAO communities.

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SUBMISSIONS: The Association is a totally voluntary enterprise. For the Journal to succeed, we need articles, letters to the editor, etc. Contributors should mail articles to the above address or e-mail to faoa@erols.com or stevehg@covad.net. Articles are subject to editing by the FAO Journal Staff, to ensure that space constraints of the publication are met.

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FAO JOURNAL

Regional Specialists

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Letter from the President

This is an exciting time for the Foreign Area Officer Community. With our Armed Forces at war, the need for Foreign Area Officers, regional specialists with political-military expertise, has never been greater. From each Combatant Command, to numerous US Government Departments and Agencies in Washington, to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, and to the UN Command in Korea, FAOs contribute immeasurably to our national security worldwide. Of that purpose, of that service, we should be proud. And to that purpose and service we must rededicate our individual efforts -- wherever we serve and whatever our component, Active or Reserve, civilian or military.

Although each of our Services has a FAO program unique to Service needs and culture – the common thread is that in all services FAOs support the Warfighters. And each of us in the FAO Community has an important role to play in that mission.

FAOs should use every professional development opportunity to build the capability to serve Warfighter needs, and prepare for future service at the sharp end of our business. Especially now, your personal and professional commitment is critical. Each of our Services has critical regional needs that offer the opportunity for aggressive and resourceful officers to both contribute and learn.

All FAOs can contribute superbly by mentoring junior FAOs. There are a myriad of opportunities for mentorship, from personal mentoring and encouragement, to support for Service FAO programs, to support for our FAO Association. Unquestionably, the force of personality and professional circumstance plays an important role – but we can all contribute.

Turning to the business of our Association, we need to elect a Board of Governors. We solicit nominations for the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, and nine Members. Of course, service is voluntary – but we'll ask those who accept nomination for Board Membership to contribute from their wisdom, expertise, and effort to support the Association. For Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member nominations, we'll accept nominations from the membership through the end of March 2004. We'll poll the general membership in the subsequent issue of the FAO Journal.

Also, we are planning a Washington Foreign Area Officer Association Dining-Out for 7 May. We'll announce the details in the subsequent issue as well.

Please use email to let our Secretariat know your current address and email. It goes without saying that current address is the only way we can stay in touch with you, and ensure you get the Journal. We realize that FAOs, as a population, are among the most mobile of any members of the Armed Forces – we appreciate your personal efforts and promise to redouble our own efforts to remain in contact.

Thank you to those of you who contribute your professional and personal efforts to enhance our Association and our FAO community, from those who produce the Journal, to those whose daily professional lives build the worldwide reputation of our Armed Forces' Foreign Area Officers.

Finally, please take the time to do something to support our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines who cannot now be with their loved ones.

Guerrilla War…Back Again?

LTG Patrick M. Hughes, USA, Retired

Guerrilla war *n*, an irregular war, usually favoring some political or philosophical objective, fought by small groups of combatants against an established or occupying power. A Spanish language term, essentially meaning "small war." Terrorism is a tactic.

Recently, U.S. Army General John Abizaid, the new head of U.S. Central Command, said forces under his command face a "classical guerrilla-type war situation". His description is apt although one can debate whether there is a classic form of this kind of war. The history of using unconventional tactics and the complementary tools of deception, surprise, ruthlessness and uncompromising violence are as old as warfare. Indeed, the only aspect of this developing condition in Iraq that may be new is the fact that technologies are available now that may change the conduct of such warfare. The nature of it has remained the same.

The history of warfare is replete with examples of the enemy within, hidden in the mass of people, using the most treacherous of means, opposing the central authorities. The descriptions vary from one place to another but the similarities are always there: an absence of obvious form, secrecy, some claim to an appeal to the common person, agility, no rules, and utter contempt for the enemy. Any weapon will do. Opportunity guides action, and the target is the will of the opponent. Break the opponent's will to sustain the fight, the guerrilla believes, and you may lose a thousand battles but gain victory in the end. This is the essence of this kind of war.

In its basic form, guerrilla war includes the idea embodied in the phrases from *The Art of Poetry on a New Plan* (1761). Vol. ii. p. 147, by Oliver Goldsmith, (1730?–1774). "*For he who fights and runs away, May live to fight another day; But he who is in battle slain, Can never rise and fight again."* The short modern version of this idea is more assertive: Fight! Run Away. Live To Fight Again Another Day. The underlying idea is clear. If you stand and fight against a superior enemy, on their terms using their rules, you may lose your life and you may fail. Thus the imperative for the guerrilla is to oppose their enemy with selective and circumstantial violence that will affect the target and the supporting base, including the political and cultural resolve that sustains the opponent. At the same time the guerrilla's hope is to retain some measure of capability through guile and cunning and the application of tactics that protect the core of their ability to continue.

There have been many approaches to fighting guerrilla war, often dependent on the peculiar set of conditions that exist at the time and place the warfare is conducted. Virtually every guerrilla war has a few consistent features: The importance of language and culture to the success of all sides, the zealotry and resolve of those who participate, and the necessity of support from the indigenous population. Defensive tactics, techniques and methods are certainly important to better protect the force. The guerrilla often relies on compartmentation of small groups and exceptional secrecy to ensure their survival, while the counter-guerrilla force is frequently forced into a defensive-reactive posture that constrains what they are able or willing to do.

However, most soldiers who have engaged in counter-guerrilla warfare believe that an effective strategy cannot be based merely on defensive measures but rather must be tied to an aggressive offensive approach, taking the war to the guerrilla, denying them sanctuary and interdicting their support, stopping their ability to assemble and plan, and taking away their capability to act. This requires exceptional training, invasive presence, insightful intelligence, and an uncommon resolve on the part of established authority to meet the great demands that an offensive strategy embodies. The countering force in successful counter-guerrilla campaigns have been more agile than their guerrilla opponents, utilizing the best of their technologies and tools, and specifically targeting and rapidly acting against the guerrillas and their supporting infrastructure.

History also tells us that the counter-guerrilla force requires manpower, training, tools, tactics and techniques adequate to the conditions extant. In order to succeed counter-guerrilla forces have always had to develop a strategy and a plan, train to that plan, and then act in a very deliberate way. This form of warfare demands something extraordinary with regard to cultural understanding and political acumen. Standard military forces, using standard tactics and techniques, will be sitting ducks for the accomplished guerrilla, especially when operating in urban environs against the backdrop of complicated political, cultural and religious forces. The counter-guerrilla force may often be its own worst enemy if its actions are perceived to be antagonistic to the local populace.

Time is an important feature of guerrilla war. Grinding down an opponent through a long and difficult evolution of small actions designed to erode confidence and to break morale, is a central idea underpinning the guerrilla's long view. The key to this view is the resolve of the guerrilla to have the patience and commitment to succeed. The American culture is sometimes described as the antithesis of this approach. Our goal is rapid success and our hope is to transition quickly to some form of acceptable post-conflict condition in which our forces are not directly at risk. Developing an understanding that some forms of warfare require long and hazardous involvement is a cultural challenge.

It is always better to mount an effective counter-guerrilla campaign as soon as possible. Time is usually an advantage for the guerrilla – not their opponent. It is not too late to form an appropriate strategy and to carry out a plan to counter the guerrilla threat that at least one U.S. General sees looming before us. However, unless we embark on those activities deliberately, using the best of our capabilities and taking advantage of lessons learned and the experience of those who have fought against such enemies, then we may in fact run out of time.

Patrick M. Hughes is a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General and was involved in operations against the Vietcong infrastructure in Vietnam, and against insurgency and guerrilla warfare in other locations.

DoD Photographs

CONSOLIDATED MILITARY ATTACHÉ AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES: A CASE FOR UNITY OF COMMAND

LtCol Kurt M. Marisa , USAF

In the post-9/11 world "global war on terror", the U.S. government (USG), Department of Defense (DoD), and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are pursuing a foreign policy of "urgency" and collaboration and a strategy of pre-emption—the ultimate objective being to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as deter other catastrophic terrorist attacks against U.S. interests at home or abroad. In this light, the DoD and JCS must ensure that their military-to-military relationships and cooperation around the world—in most cases as established through in-country U.S. Defense Attaché Offices (DAO) and Security Assistance Offices (SAO)—are established and maintained in a way that fully supports this policy, strategy, and objective.

However, the Cold War system of worldwide military assistance offices responsible for security assistance and weapons sales—usually separate and distinct from DAOs and any intelligence reporting and force protection responsibility—may have outlived its usefulness and practicality. In recent decades, U.S. military security assistance and security cooperation (previously called military engagement) activities were conducted for the primary purpose of increasing U.S. influence in a country and supporting foreign policy, with little connection to in-country reporting and representational missions. The assistance and reporting missions were purposefully kept separate and distinct in most cases, but must they really be mutually exclusive?

This "split-unit" DAO/SAO configuration may have worked adequately for decades during the Cold War. However, this was a period when U.S. friends and enemies were clearer; U.S. defense sales more robust; force protection not the paramount concern it is today; and defense budget authorizations and personnel resources more able to support redundant units and a large in-country military presence. But in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era, the reality is that the DoD must draw down resources in less critical parts of the world, and reassign personnel and reallocate resources to priority "hot spots." The current DAO/SAO system, with the lack of a clear, single senior military officer responsible for all in-country programs and DoD policy, is increasingly attracting the attention of DoD, JCS, and combatant command leadership budget-cutters and planners responsible for rationalizing the overseas military presence.

The DoD will increasingly have a reduced ability to adequately resource multiple embassy-based military units worldwide. Consequently, a new way of conducting business overseas is needed to better integrate and consolidate the defense attaché and security assistance missions to conform to 21st century imperatives, one in which the responsibility for all DoD policy and the control and management of all attaché, security assistance, and security cooperation activities rests with one senior officer in each country. Consolidated DAO/SAO operations offer many advantages over the split-unit arrangement, including improved unity of command and effort; a reduction in DoD manpower and resource requirements; a smaller military "footprint" with a lower force protection threat; and an increased synergy between the DAO and SAO missions. Each of these advantages will be analyzed, with emphasis on the benefits of a closer integration between U.S. security assistance programs and attaché reporting, drawing the conclusion that consolidated DAO/SAOs is preferable to the current split-unit system.

Background

During the Napoleonic years of the early 1800s, France began the practice of adding military personnel to its diplomatic missions, a system which many other European nations adopted. The primary purpose of military diplomats was to observe and report on the military developments in their host nations. The first official military attaché to the United States—a naval attaché from the United Kingdom— was not accredited until 1867, and the U.S. did not enter the military diplomacy game until 1877 when the first attachés were dispatched to Russia, Austria, and Turkey. The main task of U.S. military attachés from the beginning was to obtain and report military information, in accordance with established diplomatic conventions.

Initially, U.S. military attachés were detailed to the Department of State (DoS). In the early 1890s, the military decided to retain more control over its attachés and subordinated them directly to their respective departments—War and Navy (7:53). At the end of WW II, with the creation of the Department of Defense and Department of the Air Force, the military created the designations of Defense Attaché (DATT), the head of the military mission; Army Attaché (ARMA); Air Force Attaché (AIRA); and Naval Attaché (ALUSNA). Then in the 1960s, all U.S. military attaches were resubordinated to the new Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), vice their respective services, a system that exists to this day, despite several initiatives to transfer the responsibility for military attaches to JCS, the military services, or to the combatant commands.

The primary missions of a Defense Attaché Office are to report military and political intelligence, perform representational functions, serve as military advisor to the ambassador and national security decision-makers, manage security cooperation/engagement activities, conduct DAO management and administration, and serve as U.S. Defense Representative and/or perform security assistance functions as assigned. In respect to the Air Force, the duties of Air Attachés are identified by Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) as to report military information responding to military and national requirements; represent the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Secretary of the Air Force, and other DoD agencies as required; advise the ambassador on military matters; and plan and direct operational and administrative functions.

With the sharp increase in arms sales and military assistance programs after WW II and during the Cold War, the military attaché offices of many western and communist nations also became responsible for managing these programs for their respective nations. Some countries even created the title of "Defense Cooperation Attaché," to designate their responsible military diplomats. While most developed nations merged their growing military assistance/sales programs with the traditional diplomatic, advisory, and reporting missions of their attachés, the United States—and to a lesser extent Britain and France—began to bifurcate the defense attaché and military assistance missions. Although the U.S. had a small number of military advisory groups (MAG) prior to WWII, the start of the Cold War caused a proliferation in the number of MAGs—separate from the traditional DAOs—to train host nation forces and run security assistance programs. MAGs were usually kept independent from DAOs, largely because of the belief that the attaché reporting mission was incompatible with military assistance programs and that security assistance and weapons sales should not be managed by, or from an office connected with, an intelligence organization. The new military assistance offices—which took a variety of names and forms such as MAG, MAAG, JUSMAG, SAO, ODA, ODC, OMC, MAC—generally fell under the reporting chain of their respective regional combatant commands.

The U.S. "security assistance" program, an important element of foreign policy guided by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, consists of economic and military assistance to allied and friendly governments. Although the DoS is responsible for directing and overseeing the program, most of the missions are administered by the DoD, including Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Excess Defense Article (EDA) transfer program, International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Humanitarian Affairs Programs (HAP). The primary DoD organization responsible for directing military security assistance missions is the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), a direct reporting unit of the DoD. Currently, the military offices in foreign countries that run security assistance activities on behalf of DSCA, in addition to supporting the security cooperation programs of the regional commands, are often called Security Assistance Offices. For consistency, the term SAO will be used throughout this paper, although many go by other designations. SAOs are also part of their ambassadors' "Country Team" at embassies around the world, but they usually retain little formal connection to, or close interaction with, the DAOs.

In comparison with the missions of a DAO, while working as an SAO Chief in 2002, the author determined the primary mission of an SAO is to support U.S. foreign policy through management of security assistance programs, including weapons sales, military training, advisory role, and humanitarian assistance. However, equally important are the security cooperation programs conducted by the SAOs on behalf of the combatant commands, often with augmentees provided by the command, but more often accomplished "out of hide." This includes serving as focal point for combatant command in-country military exercises; conducting and managing command engagement activities; acting as the military representative of the combatant commander; acting as military focal point for disaster relief and other military operations as required; and serving as U.S. Defense Representative/diplomatic representative as required.

In each country, U.S. security assistance programs are primarily administered through one of four configurations—separate SAOs, DAO-managed programs, augmented-DAOs, and DoS run programs. In FY03, separate SAOs existed in 79 countries, although the majority had only a few personnel. Additionally, in the majority of the 166 countries in which the U.S. offered security assistance, 101 were administered by SAOs. The activities in most of the remaining countries were administered by DAOs (55 locations), either using augmentation personnel from DSCA and/or the combatant commands (37 locations) or without any augmentation (18 locations). The remaining 10 countries were administered directly by the DoS. However, aside from some exceptions which have DAO-administered programs for various geo-political reasons—the most significant being Russia, Israel, China, Algeria, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Yemen, Mexico, and Canada—the DAO-administered security assistance programs are usually in small or strategically less important countries in Africa and Asia. A significant disparity also exists between commands. Within the 83 countries in the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR), 45 programs are run by SAOs— 43 by DAOs and five by DoS. Similarly, within PACOM's 30 countries of responsibility, 14 are run by DAOs, 11 by SAOs, and five by DoS. In contrast, CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM programs are run almost exclusively by SAOs—17 SAOs and three DAOs in the former and 28 SAOs and five DAOs in the latter.

SAO offices are primarily established and manned using DSCA "administrative fees," obtained through security assistance programs, for the purpose of running FMS, FMF, IMET, and HAP, although some manning and funding comes directly from the combatant commands. However, in many countries, the combatant commands have turned their SAOs into frontline engagement "Mil Groups." In fact, the majority of activities conducted by many SAOs are in direct support of combatant command security cooperation/engagement activities, exercises, and operations for which the SAOs are usually not fully manned or trained to properly accomplish.

Although attachés and security assistance officers are drawn from the same candidate pool of Foreign Area Officers (FAO) and other qualified personnel, only the U.S. Army has created a career track to select, train, develop, and promote officers to serve as both military attachés and security assistance personnel. The Army primarily chooses attachés and security assistance officers from within its FAO program, with some SAO personnel coming from the acquisitions and logistics career fields. Air Force selections for attaché and security assistance assignments are made directly by AFPC assignment specialists. Attaché nominees are confirmed by the Air Staff International Airmen Division, but are not dependent upon the individual having the FAO specialty. Within the Navy, ALUSNAs are selected by the Office of Naval Intelligence, usually from naval warfare career fields and not intelligence, and security assistance personnel are assigned by Navy "detailers." Although desired, nominees are not required to have the Navy FAO designation. The U.S. Marine Corps also maintains a small cadre of FAOs.

Security assistance personnel are trained at a 3-week course at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) at Wright-Patterson Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio. All military attachés are prepared at a 12-week course taught at DIA's Joint Military Attaché School (JMAS) in Washington DC, and some also attend DISAM if performing security assistance duties. Although focusing on their respective areas of expertise, both courses have as an objective to train military personnel as U.S. representatives abroad and to work in an embassy environment.

Despite both being integrated parts of the embassy Country Teams, the DAOs and SAOs have different chains of command, often competing objectives, little interaction, and in more than a few cases—semi-hostile relations. The plethora of 1-5 person micro-unit DAOs and SAOs are each "commanded" by a senior U.S. military officer (O-4 to O-6). These officers are vulnerable to the "rice bowl" syndrome, with each DATT and SAO Chief working to maximize their influence and access with the ambassador and host nation military, often at the expense of the other. Neither is solely responsible for implementing overall DoD policy in their assigned country. By way of comparison, whereas SAO Chiefs usually report to the J4, J5, or Chief of Staff of their respective combatant commands, DATTs report directly to the Director of the Defense HUMINT Service of DIA. Although attaché performance is formally rated through DIA, both ambassadors and command senior officers—including the commander, J2, and J5—may provide input. Both SAO Chiefs and DATTs must perform to their ambassador's satisfaction or risk relief for cause.

In an attempt to reconcile the competing, and sometimes conflicting, roles of the DATTs and SAO Chiefs, the DoD issued DoD Instruction 5105.57 in 1975 to create the designation of "U.S. Defense Representative" (USDR). The USDR designation is used to identify the military officer who is the in-country representative of the DoD, JCS, and unified combatant commanders—as well as being responsible for in-country security/force protection and other administrative issues common to both DAOs and SAOs. The USDR (who is either the DATT, SAO Chief, or in a few cases an operational force commander) is nominated for each country by the JCS, in consultation with the respective regional combatant commanders, and approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD(P)). Overall, DATTs are appointed more frequently as USDR than SAO Chiefs—currently DATTs in 144 countries and SAO Chiefs in 38 countries —but the regional differences in application are substantial. Largely because it does not have any permanently assigned combatant forces in its AOR, with a few exceptions SOUTHCOM prefers that SAO Chiefs serve as the USDR. In EUCOM, DATTs are normally designated as the USDR, and in CENTCOM and PACOM it is mixed.

Analysis Of The Issues

The current DoD system of in-country military representation remains inherently dysfunctional for many DATTs and SAO Chiefs alike, as well as for the respective ambassadors and combatant commanders. Many ambassadors have failed to understand why they must have multiple, often "bickering," military bosses on their Country Teams and some have directed there can be only one military officer in charge. In countries with both DAOs and SAOs, neither the DATTs nor the SAO Chiefs have been designated as being solely responsible for overall DoD policy, and the USDR designation has failed to address this dysfunction, resulting in an inconsistent "personality-dependent" application—in some locations the DATT and SAO Chief arrive at a workable, cooperative arrangement, in others they try to stay clear of each other, and in too many countries the DAOs and SAOs work at cross-purposes. In the worst cases, more than once an ambassador has relieved either the DATT, SAO Chief, or both for failure to cooperate.

The USDR designation was faulty from the beginning. Partly designed to address the problem of who is "in charge" between DATTs and SAO Chiefs, it is a classic example of the inadequate results of a compromise solution. The original directive, as well as its updated versions, failed to clear up confusion over the relationship between DAOs and SAOs—and actually complicated matters further. As stated, the directive chose a title for the designation that would indicate the USDR is indeed the top military representative. However, the directive states the designation of USDR is only an "additional duty". In actuality and in accordance with diplomatic norms, the DATT is the only diplomatically-accredited representative to the host nation of the DoD, JCS, and his/her respective military service. Although not diplomatically-accredited, SAO Chiefs often have been viewed as the primary representative of the combatant commanders to the host nation, though many DATTs claim this label as well. The USDR designation has only muddled the "representation" picture. Unfortunately, many combatant commands, DAOs, and SAOs at times have used the title and authorities of USDR to suit their own agendas.

DoDI 5105.57 also assigned to the USDR the responsibility for the security and force protection of all permanent and temporary duty non-combatant military personnel in-country but stated that the USDR "will not become involved in intelligence matters". This statement has created the most confusion, particularly with DIA, since DATTs by definition work for DIA and perform an intelligence support mission. Furthermore, in order for an SAO Chief to provide security and force protection for in-country military personnel, he/she would obviously require an involvement with intelligence. The fact is that most SAO Chiefs serving as USDR lack the resources and training to properly accomplish the security/force protection requirements.

Adding to concerns over lack of unity of command and a muddled force protection mission, the counterintelligence (CI) organizations of the military services have created "force protection" units at several embassies. Although the small units are loosely attachéd to DAOs for reporting oversight, they remain independent elements outside the reporting chain of the DAO.

Rather than being a rational system, the current primary method of establishing in-country military representation is a dysfunctional compromise that places the burden of responsibility at each embassy on the two senior military officers assigned. The current system is overdue for an indepth study of ways to improve the security assistance/cooperation missions, and make them more relevant to warfighting needs, as well as of the optimal subordination and reporting chain for DAO and SAO personnel. In this time of national urgency, military transformation, diminishing military personnel and tightening budgets, and the need to reduce the U.S. military footprint around the world, it is becoming increasingly important to re-think, rationalize, and transform the current Cold War system of U.S. overseas military presence. The "old way" of establishing military components of Country Teams is in need of being "transformed." In reality, the issue has emerged repeatedly in recent years at various forums.

At the regional combatant commander's conference in early 2000, one major issue identified was the defense attaché rating chain. Most combatant commanders, led by CENTCOM, desired that DATTs fall under their direct chain of command rather than under DIA. During mid-2001, after consultations with the J2s and J5s of the combatant commands, JCS/J5 recommended keeping the DATTs under the DIA chain of command.

At the 2002 Western Hemisphere "DATT Conference," attended by the author, many DATTs complained about the interactions and relationships with the SOUTHCOM "Mil Groups" in their countries who, as the designated USDRs, often sought to exclude the DAOs from access to and influence with the host nation militaries, as well as with SOUTHCOM leadership. In fact, a primary action item was revision of DoD Instruction 5105.57 on USDR roles. Similarly, at the annual SOUTHCOM Naval Attaché Conference in September 2002, using the Goldwater Nichols Act to justify their position, the ALUSNAs determined that the current dual-unit system is unworkable and that DAOs and SAOs should be consolidated whenever feasible.

In November 2000, a Pentagon-level working group comprised of DIA, DSCA, JCS/J5, and combatant command representatives concluded that the USDR designation was "confusing and had outlived its usefulness," and recommended that the designation be terminated and USDR responsibilities—except for force protection—be transferred to the DATTs. However, a follow-on review was delayed by other staff actions and finally "shelved" after 9/11.

The issue reemerged in early June 2003 when JCS/J5 hosted another USDR program review which again concluded that the USDR designation is misunderstood and corrective action is needed. The panel proposed three options: 1) keep the USDR program intact but redefine authorities and functions, 2) eliminate the designation and redistribute functions to DATTs and SAO Chiefs, and 3) consolidate DoD embassy-based programs under a single, senior officer, thus eliminating the need for a separate USDR designation. Although still pending, the final report and recommendations must be staffed through the combatant commands and affected defense agencies—and approved by the OSD(P)—but future change appears likely.

The current system of multiple military units at most embassies, with an absence of unity of command, will be difficult to sustain in the future. In the following sections, the advantages of consolidated DAO/SAO operations will be discussed, including 1) improved unity of command and effort; 2) a reduction in committed DoD manpower, financial, and logistics commitments and requirements; 3) a smaller in-country U.S. military "footprint" with a reduced force protection threat; and 4) an increased synergy between DAO and SAO missions.

The current DAO/SAO system is contrary to some elements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Designed to institutionalize "jointness," the act also focused on unity of command and, in particular, assigned primacy of the regional commands over all U.S. military activities in their AOR. However, the current DAO/SAO system is contrary to the basic military principles of unity of effort and command. No other nation in the world, except the UK and France in some locations, has established separate DAOs and SAOs at diplomatic missions around the world. Other countries apparently do not see an inherent conflict in the ability of a single military unit to perform the roles of security assistance, diplomatic representation, and military advisor, along with the task of military reporting. Only the U.S. has created the "myth" that these missions cannot be done by one unit.

In reality, most host nations do not differentiate between the missions and purposes of the DAOs and SAOs. The common belief within U.S. military circles that military assistance and information

(Continued on page 21)

Indo-U.S. Military Cooperation: Taking Stock

By Colonel Steven Sboto, USA, Defense Attaché

Almost two years after the lifting of U.S. sanctions and restarting the Indo-U.S. Defense Policy Group meetings, bi-lateral military cooperation remains one of the most vibrant, visible, and pro-active legs in the overall gamut of Indo-U.S. relations that is powering what has been come to be known as the "transformation" of U.S.-India relations. In comparison to a "flat chapati," an analogy that has been used to typify U.S.-India trade relations, military cooperation is a food-filled "puri," oozing even more future potential.

Much of what has been accomplished from the U.S. side has been a result of the U.S. military's carrying out the spirit of President Bush's desires for creating a fundamental shift in U.S.-India relations articulated shortly after he took office. On the Indian side, there has been a tremendous effort to look to expand areas of mutual benefit, to look for partnerships not antagonisms, and to look for regional collaboration. India's service chiefs have translated this positive direction into a coordinated program of military engagement priorities with the U.S. In sum, military cooperation across the board has seen dramatic improvements in the number and quality of training exercises, seminars, personnel exchanges, senior visits, functional visits, unit/ship visits, subject matter expert exchanges, organizational/agency relationships, technology cooperation, and defense sales.

Military cooperation is an objective based program. It is designed to promote mutual understanding, familiarization, and confidence building through exercises, exchange of doctrine, high-level visits, courses, seminars, and focU.S. on areas of mutual interest. On all of these counts, India and the U.S. have succeeded remarkably thus far.

Indo-U.S. Defense cooperation is still conducted under the 1995 Agreed Minute on Defense Cooperation that recognized the importance of enhanced cooperation to the well being of the overall Indo-U.S. relationship. The Agreed Minute envisaged cooperation based on three "legs": 1) closer ties at the level of civilian defense leadership, 2) between the uniformed services, and, 3) in the field of defense production and research. This structure for cooperation remains solid and has been exercised vigorously over the last two years. It consists of five consultative groups that have each met at least twice in the last two years.

Defense Policy Group - DPG
(MOD - DOD – State Dept-MEA)

Military Cooperation Group - MCG
(PACOM - Integrated Defense Staff – SOCPAC - Indian Services)

Executive Steering Groups - ESGs
(PACAF-PACFLT-USARPAC –SOCPAC- Indian Services)

Joint Technical Group - JTG
(Under Secretary Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics - DRDO)

Security Cooperation Group - SCG
(DSCA - MOD)

Two rounds of the DPG and the associated MCG, ESG, JTG, and SCG have resulted in agreement in numeroU.S. areas. Here are but a few:

Continue cooperation in Missile Defense
Sharing presentations on regional security issues
Discussing issues in CENTCOM's AOR
Conducting "High Policy Roundtables"
Cooperating in Peacekeeping Training
Humanitarian/Disaster Relief
Combating Terrorism
Consequence Management
Environmental Security
Search & Rescue
Combined Naval Patrols in Strait of Malacca
Selling Firefinder radars
Acquiring P-3 Orions and Destroyers

Solving Sea King Spares issue
Expanding Special Forces Training
Conducting Dissimilar Air Combat Training
Expanding Navy Malabar Exercises off coast of India

Military cooperation succeeds because of the Indian and U.S. military establishments' mutual desire to move our relationship forward. The pace of military cooperation has been measured, but robust. In comparison to all other foreign militaries, the U.S. military has what could be argued as the most frequent and substantive relationship with the Indian military. Importantly, there is a growing desire among the Indian military and strong commitment by Indian service chiefs to expand defense cooperation on a broader front. This point is easily salient when reviewing the growing number of activities and the agency-based relationships that have emerged over the past two years.

Indians Taking Advantage of Expanding Training Opportunities

The DOD managed International Military education and Training (IMET) program funding last year was $1 million (the highest level ever) - which enabled 37 Indian officers to attend training in the U.S. The amount requested for next year has been increased to $1.2 million. In addition to this, last year there were more than 200 Indian participants at 53 military related conferences (also a record high). The U.S. continued to take advantage of training opportunities in India as well with students attending the National Defense College, DSSC, and Indian Air Force Pilot Training Course, and participants in an NDC-hosted Asia Regional Forum conference.

Sailors, Ships, Aircraft, Airmen, and Soldiers Expand Activities

14 U.S. Navy ships visited India since Nov 2001 as well as two Aircraft Carrier Distinguished Visitor Days. In April and Sep 2002 the Indian Navy Ships Sukanya and INS Sharda conducted patrols and escorts of U.S. ships through the Malacca Straits in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. In Sep 2002 the U.S. Army's 1st Battalion, 501st Airborne Infantry Regiment welcomed 80 soldiers from the 50th Independent Parachute Brigade flying to Alaska in an IAF IL-76 to exercise "Geronimo Thrust." Indian and American paratroopers conducted the first-ever 'live' firing exercise there. In September-October 2002 a tactical naval exercise called Malabar, covering surface, sub-surface and air warfare over the seas occurred. Indian Navy's Western Fleet fielded Indian ships comprising its indigenous Delhi-class destroyer INS Delhi, a Godavari-class frigate INS Gomati, a Shishumar-class submarine INS Shankul, and the tanker INS Aditya. These Indian ships were arrayed against the U.S. Navy's USS Chancellorsville, a Ticonderoga class Guided Missile Cruiser, the USS Paul F Foster, a Spruance Class Destroyer, and an SSN submarine. Besides, a Maritime Reconnaissance Aircraft P 3C Orion and Lamps III of the U.S. Navy and Dornier, Seaking and Allouette aircraft of Indian Navy also took part in this exercise. This was the biggest "tactical" exercise held so far between, the Indian Navy and the U.S. Over 1500 U.S. and Indian naval personnel participated during the four day event which featured multi-maneuvers such as flying operations, anti-submarine warfare exercises, and replenishment at sea to test each others capabilities at all levels of naval operations. In October 2002, an air transport exercise (Cope India-02) was held to develop a baseline for future interoperability that will include a fighter aircraft exchange. USAF personnel on board Indian IAF IL-76s and Antonov-32s observed Indian paratroopers and heavy equipment being paradropped. The Indians marked the difference in the way the Americans drop cargo with drag-parachutes and prepare drop zones. Both air forces learned each other's formation flying techniques. By the end of the exercise, Indian troops learned to drop from U.S. C-130 Hercules transporters. India and the U.S. have also conducted several navy Search and Rescue exercises over the past two years. In October 2003, the U.S. and Indian Navies conducted Malabar 2003, the most complex joint exercise off the coast of Kerala involving aircraft, warships, submarines, and P-3 Orions. In addition to traditional wartime areas, Malabar 2003 exercised in new disciplines such as maritime interception operation of suspect vessels. The Pentagon's key future think tank, the Office of Net Assessment and its Indian IDS counterpart conducted the first seminar in India in 2002, which has lead to exchanges between the defense research and analyses communities in both countries. In Sep 2003 an oil-spill distaster management at sea "table top" was conducted at USI with the Indian Navy, Coast Guard.

Senior Visits

Often the catalyst for new activities, senior military visits proceeded with remarkable pace. All three Indian Service Chiefs visited the U.S. in 2002. Commander Pacific Command visited India for the third time in two years in Dec 2002. Commander U.S. Air Forces Pacific visited India in April 2003. The U.S. Army Chief Staff, visited India in February 2003. Commander, U.S. Army Forces Pacific visited India in June 2003. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff visited India in July 2003. India's Air Chief visited the U.S. again in Sep 2003. The U.S. Chief of Naval Operations visited India in October 2003.

Institutional Relationships Take Off

There have been meetings between U.S. and Indian Defense Intelligence Agencies in 2002 and 2003 to include an Exchange Conference in DC in July 2003. The Chief of India's New Defense Intelligence Agency traveled to the U.S. on a counterpart visit twice in the past 16 months to understand the workings of military intelligence at the national level. The U.S. Joint Staff in the Pentagon and the Indian Integrated Defense Staff established a formal relationship in April 2002 during the first Joint Staff Talks in DC, led by India's Vice Chief of Defense Staff, LtGen Joshi. The second set of Joint Staff Talks was held in Sep 2003 in India. These talks and visits of several specific IDS officers to various U.S. Joint Staff offices have occurred regularly to discuss tri-service institutions, joint military planning, and tri- service doctrine. The U.S. Air Force safety and logistics experts have begun a relationship with the Indian Air Force, to include a visit to India in September 2002, which will help the Indian Air Force improve is readiness and safety programs. The USAF and IAF restarted an instructor pilot exchange program in 2002 in which an Indian pilot lives and trains in the U.S. and a U.S. pilot does the same in Hyderabad, India. The U.S. and Indian Coast Guards have begun a cooperative relationship with the visit of Director General of the Indian Coast Guard, Admiral Bansal to the U.S. Dialogue on missile defense has progressed. Indian experts participated in a missile defense game in Colorado in June 2002. Indian defense officials have made trips to the U.S. over the past two years to specifically talk about future involvement in missile defense programs. A Missile Defense Workshop is likely to be held in New Delhi in 2004. India has been invited to attend multilateral BMD conferences in Kyoto and Berlin and to observe the U.S. Roving Sands MD exercise when it's next conducted.

Special Forces Expand Relationships

There were a number of Special Forces exercises held to include heliborne operations, counter-terrorism training, mountain warfare, close quarter combat, and jungle warfare exercises. Three Balance Iroquois exercises with Indian Army's Special Forces were held over the past 10 months. Two exercises were in India, and one in Guam. Exercise Flash Iroquois, a Navy Special Forces exercise will also be conducted in the near future.

Other SOF Exercises and Activities

-Pacific Area Special Operations Conference (Feb 03)
-Small Unit Tactics, Para Drops, May 02, India
-Close Quarter Combat, May 02, Ft. Lewis, WA
-Live Fire Exercises, Apr 03, India
-Counter-Terrorism, May 03, India
-Platoon Exercise, June 03, Guam
-Close Quarter Combat, Aug 03, Ft. Lewis, WA

Other Significant Exchanges

U.S. Army – Indian Army Aviation units exchanged helicopter pilots in India Jan 03 and in Alaska, Aug 03. There was a PKO Multi-lateral exercise in Bangladesh in 2002 in which the Indian army participated. The U.S. Military Academy conducted an exchange with IMA in May and July 2003. There was an Army High Altitude Medical Subject matter expert exchange in June 2003 in Leh. There was an Army Intelligence Subject matter expert exchange in Aug 2003 in GOA.

Peacekeeping Cooperation

An Indian Army-U.S. Army Peacekeeping CPX "Shanti Path" driven by the latest computer wargaming simulation was held at India's USI in February 2003. It involved many regional countries and over 100 participants. This was the largest Peacekeeping Operation and Command Post Exercise ever held in South Asia and was co-hosted by the Indian Army and U.S. Army Pacific. The U.S. has opened its Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities

(EIPC) programs to India. India received $800,000 in EIPC funds to be utilized over next five years on PKO training. India has allocated $ 300,000 of these funds on training. EIPC funds can be used for training at institutional level (e.g. training assessment, logistical planning, instructor training, simulation training), procurement of equipment (e.g. VCRs, overhead projection equipment, hardware and software, equipment for CPXs, English language training), and peacekeeping seminars and conferences, and procurement of manuals, pamphlets, and other library sources.

Expanding Areas of Military Cooperation

The future will be driven by those activities proposed during the meetings of the Executive Steering Groups and Military Cooperation Groups, however, already on the table are a number of new ideas. PACOM's Center of Excellence is seeking cooperation in establishing a program with the Indian military, which will couple efforts by University of Hawaii, Tripler Army Medical Center, and Naval Postgraduate School for regional HIV/AIDS prevention. India's Integrated Defense Staff agreed to co-host PACOM's Multinational Planning Augmentation Team-07 PKO CPX series in Aug 2004. The Indian Army will co-host the Pacific Armies Management Seminar. The U.S. Joint Staff will continue to sponsor subject matter expert visits of the IDS to the U. S. Joint Staff. The Indian military will be invited to joint training institutions such as Joint Forces Command, National Defense University, Joint Readiness Training Center, and the National Training Center to allow the IDS and the Indian military access to such training venues. Valuable lessons on "jointness" can be incorporated into India's nascent joint staff system and throughout the services. The IDS will also visit CENTCOM and SOCOM as part of the IDS-Joint Staff cooperation during the next month. Air Force Exercise COPE India 04 is a Dissimilar Air Combat Training Exercise. This will be the largest U.S.-India air exercise, and involve more complex scenarios to include U.S. F-15c's, and Su-30, Mirages, and Jaguars of the Indian Air Force. This is to be followed by Cooperative Cope Thunder 04 in Alaska.

What Do India and U.S. Stand to Gain from this cooperation?

Indo-U.S. military cooperation has the implied desired end-state of developing a professional desire and capability to work "inter-operably." Progress in interoperability will depend on a number of factors to include frequency of training exchanges, exchange of doctrines, and access to equipment. India's desire to buy U.S. equipment through the Foreign Military Sales system and U.S. willingness to sell state of the art equipment are clearly converging. The more we exercise together, the greater the rationale on both sides for providing Indian access to weapons, communication, doctrine and other technologies. There is the unquestioned professional development of each other's personnel. Cooperation develops transparency and leads to a reduction of suspicions. It increases dialogue on security issues of concern to India and the U.S.. India and the U.S. military gain valuable lessons learned in Joint Operations, Peacekeeping Operations, Humanitarian Action/Disaster Relief, High Altitude Operations, Search and Rescue, Jungle Warfare, Counter Insurgency, Air Combat, and Sub-Warfare.

With the establishment of India's Integrated Defense Staff, the U.S. Joint Staff has been liberal in its sharing valuable lessons learned to assist IDS in developing its nascent organizations: eg: NET Assessment, and Indian National Defense University. Joint Staff talks lead to exchange of ideas and the planned visits of IDS personnel to U.S. institutions will progress India's development of tri-service institutions, joint military planning, and tri-service doctrine.

Cooperation in counter terrorism: SOCPAC's Special Forces exercise program with India's special forces hones mutual counter-terrorism skills and exposes the Indian military to a wide range of U.S. equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures. The Indian army has tested much of this equipment during exercises and has requested to purchase some of it. The Indian IDS has been presented opportunities to cooperate with PACOM's Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group for Combating Terrorism. Opening up new avenues such as establishing counter-terrorism fellowship program will further assist the Indian military.

Asia Foreign Area Officer Conference in Seoul

LTC David W. Chin, USA

In coordination with the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) proponent office (DAMO-SSF), G-3, U. S. Army; the FAO assignments branch, U.S. Army Personnel Command; and the Plans Policies and Operations Department, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Defense Attaché Office (USDAO) Seoul hosted the first Asia FAO In-Country Trainee conference in Seoul, Korea from 6-9 May 2003. The core audience was the U.S. Army and Marine Corps FAO In-Country Trainee community in Asia. Approximately 30 U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers from Korea, Japan, China, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, India, and Bangladesh attended the conference. In addition, U.S. Air Force FAOs training in Korea, U.S. Army FAOs serving in Korea and Japan, and the U.S. Army Attaché from Japan, COL Patrick Oyabe, also attended the conference. The purpose of the conference was to provide an opportunity for Army and Marine Corps Asian FAO In-Country Trainees to meet, discuss, share, and learn. Taking full advantage of the geographic location of the conference in Seoul, Korea, the conference drew on regional resources to provide each attendee with first-hand background on one of the most important areas of U.S. military commitment now and in the foreseeable future. It was also a venue for FAO In-Country trainees to meet with senior leaders in the FAO community to discuss the direction of the FAO functional area and seek opportunities for professional development. During the conference, senior representatives of U.S., Korean, and international organizations spoke to the FAO In-Country Trainees about their challenges in the region. Also, representatives from G-3, Army and Headquarters, Marine Corps addressed the state of their respective service FAO programs.

ASIA FAO Conference Attendees: 7 May 03, UNC Officers Club

The Asia FAO conference began on the morning of 6 May 2003 with personal career interviews with the FAO assignments officer, PERSCOM, and included both Asia FAO In-Country Trainees and FAOs serving in Korea. Personal interviews were scheduled for the entire day, followed by an informal reception at the U.S. Defense and Army Attaché', COL (P) John Adams' quarters in Yongsan, Korea. On 7 May 2003, the conference began with welcoming remarks by COL (P) Adams, followed by a group photo session at the United Nations Command (UNC) Officer's Mess. The day's itinerary included briefings by LTC Vasilios Fotopoulos, 48 D/F/H/I program manager at the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) proponent office (DAMO-SSF), G-3, U.S. Army

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and the 48 D/G/H/I FAO assignments officer, US Army Personnel Command, Major Clayton Holt.


Conference Attendees at Conference Row
Joint Security Area, Panmunjom, 8 May 03

LTC Fotopoulos mentioned that this year the proponent only accessed 115 Captains into FAO but expects to keep a maximum of only 60 during Career Field Designation (CFD), down from the 80-90 in previous years. He stressed that FAO proponent is doing all it can to ensure that those officers who successfully complete their FAO training and remain competitive for promotion remain as FAOs during the CFD board. In past years, a fairly large number of our FAO trainees were returned to their basic branches. FAO proponent is working to prevent this situation in the future. Furthermore, FAO proponent intends to document FAO training, in effect certifying FA 48 Officer's ability to serve as FAOs. Finally, LTC Fotopoulos emphasized that in addition to being proficient in at least one regional language as well as the region's, history, culture and society, FAO's must also master the English language to be successful in their FAO and Army career.

Major Holt, the Asia and Middle East FAO PERSCOM assignments officer, indicated that FAOs are in greater demand than ever before from the Joint Chiefs of Staff down to combatant commands and below. He noted that while this is welcomed by FAO branch, in some cases this has caused FAOs in-training to be pulled out of training to fill immediate personnel requirements and some FAOs are even being asked to deploy out of their area of concentration. Although this is a recent development, it seems to indicate that the Army is not averse to deploying FAOs out of their region of expertise when the Army needs officers with general FAO skills for operations in complex international environments. The assignment officer also reminded all conference attendees that he is not the only one making assignment decisions at FAO branch. There are layers of officers involved in the process at PERSCOM to ensure that the needs of the Army and, when possible, the needs of the individual officer are balanced to place the right officer in the right job. He also mentioned that FAO assignments branch has begun to discuss the idea of bringing another assignment officer. Major Holt discussed officer promotions and generally noted that if an officer has more above center of mass (ACOM) officer evaluation reports (OER) than center of mass (COM) OERs, then the officer should have a good chance for promotion. However, he noted that every FAO year group and AOC are different in terms of population size and file strength. The kind of file it takes to get a YG 87 48H promoted may be different from that which gets a YG 92 48D promoted. When describing OERs, Major Holt mentioned that quantifying the officer's performance is crucial – "1 of 5", "top 10 percent", etc - and concise wording is better than someone attempting to fill the evaluation block with insignificant, vaguely worded achievements. He also advised officers to inform non-FAO senior raters that FAO's career goals should be commensurate with FAO career progression (e.g., Chief of Joint U.S. Military Affairs Group (JUSMAG) or Defense and Army Attaché, rather than battalion command.) Major Holt further encouraged FAOs to regularly read military personnel messages to keep track of important events and suspenses, such as for promotion and senior service college boards. He noted that failure to keep abreast of suspenses can affect the officer's chances for promotion. Finally, Major Holt advised officers to always follow-up on completed OERs to ensure that they are processed timely by the local personnel service center and placed in records so that the officer is always prepared for the file to be reviewed.

The rest of the first day included briefings by representatives of Naval Forces –Korea, U.S. Forces Korea, a U.S. Embassy Joint/Interagency roundtable (representatives from several agencies on the U.S. Embassy Seoul Country Team), Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, Joint U.S. Military Affairs Group – Korea, and a reception in honor of the Asia Foreign Area Officers at the Ambassador's residence. On 8 May, Assistant Secretary, United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) escorted the conference attendees to the Joint Security Area (JSA) for a tour of Conference Row, JSA, followed by an UNCMAC Brief and a visit to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) Camp. After the NNSC-hosted luncheon, the conference attendees visited the Bridge of No Return and Observation Post Dora overlooking the Western Transportation Corridor being constructed in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) to reconnect the rail and road links between South and North Korea. Upon return to Seoul from the JSA and the DMZ, the U.S. Forces Korea International Relations Officer and a FAO from USFK J-5 Strategy Division presented current and long-term issues for the ROK-U.S. Alliance. The discussion highlighted the new U.S. military strategy and the challenges the U.S. faces in convincing allies of the strategy's viability and ultimately integrating them into our strategy.

This briefing was followed by Marine Forces – Korea and U.S. Marine Corps International Affairs Officer program briefings. The latter brief noted two separate but interrelated specialties of the Marine IAO program. The one is the traditional FAO program and the other is the Regional Affairs Officer (RAO) program. The Marine FAO spends a year at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), followed by language and in-country training. The RAO only receives 18 months of graduate studies at NPS prior to a utilization tour. However, both specialties must balance primary branch and FAO assignments to be competitive for promotion, similar to the way the Army managed its FAOs under the old personnel system. On 9 May, Conference Attendees visited the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and received a briefing about the ROK JCS, the ROK military, the North Korean threat, and discussed issues ranging from ROK participation in peacekeeping operations to the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance. After the visit to the JSA, Conference attendees made an office call on



General (Ret) Paik, Sun-Yup briefs Conference Attendees about the Korean War and its Personalities, 9 May 03

(Continued from page 17)
General (Retired) Paik, Sun-Yup, former ROK Army Chief of Staff and current Chairman of the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War Commemoration Committee. General (Retired) Paik took time out of his busy schedule for an office call with the group and briefed key events and personalities during the Korean War.

After the visit with General (Retired) Paik, the group received a guided tour of the Korean War Memorial. The tour guide escorted the group through the memorial hall honoring Korea's war dead and the war history rooms highlighting artifacts from the pre-historic age to the Korean War. After the visit to the War Memorial, the conference attendees returned to the UNC Officer's Mess for a serious of briefings presented by FAOs from Korea, Japan, China, Malaysia, India, Vietnam, and Indonesia.

Major Dawn Rodeschin, Japan-based FAO trainee briefs U.S.-Japan security relations, 9 May 03

Korea-based 48Hs briefed the history of the ROK-US Alliance from the Korean War until today. They focused on the political, economic, social and military factors that have influenced ROK-U.S. relations in the past and discussed current issues affecting the future of the alliance. Major Dawn Rodeschin, a Japan-based 48H, briefed U.S.-Japan Security Relations by highlighting the alliance's history, components of the alliance, dangers and challenges, accomplishments and trends, and the future of the alliance. Captain John Schurtz, a China FAO, briefed the regional strategic appraisal for China noting U.S. national interests in Northeast Asia, factors affecting U.S. interests in the region, U.S. regional policy trends and objectives, and potential risks. Finally, FAOs from South Asia briefed political, social, military and economic issues concerning Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, India and several other countries in South Asia.

At the conclusion of the conference, most agreed that it was worthwhile for Asia FAOs to get together periodically somewhere in the region to discuss country specific issues, broad regional issues and other professional agenda items. More importantly, many realized that this kind of forum can be crucial in times of crisis because it encourages FAOs to become experts in their country or region while promoting a more regional approach to being a FAO. Although this task is challenging, it is likely to become more relevant as FAOs are asked to work out of their area of concentration and when the nature and intensity of crisis calls for FAOs to serve anywhere in the world. Furthermore, judging from the interaction of the attendees and the exchange of ideas and experiences, the conference served its main goal – to bring FAO trainees together to meet, discuss, share and learn. At a time when Asia is clouded with nuclear proliferation uncertainty, filled with terrorism threats, plagued by disease epidemics like SARS and AIDS, and coping with economic and political instability, the conference was a great forum for future attachés, security assistance officers, and political-military advisors/analysts to meet and exchange their views. LTC Fotopoulos, in closing, indicated that he will begin work promptly upon returning to the Pentagon to plan for next year's Asia FAO conference.

Partition's Princely Pawn: The Saga of Kashmir

Major Randy Koehlmoos, USA, 48D

The current dilemma over possession of the area historically known as Kashmir poses the greatest threat to the security and stability of South Asia. No issue is more complicated or multi-facetted than the dispute over Kashmir and it continues to be the most divisive issue in the Asian subcontinent. This dilemma involves two nuclear weapons capable belligerents--India and Pakistan; both possess instinctually militant personalities and gross misperceptions of the opposing force, and both desire ownership of Kashmir. The Kashmir saga involves the endless search for truth; India and Pakistan do not even agree that the territory is disputed and interpret history differently to justify their bipolar positions. The problem of Kashmir is not so much one of resources, strategic ground, or of its historical or international legal status, but an issue of domestic political legitimacy. When the first India-Pakistan war ended with a UN cease-fire in January 1949, about two-thirds of the Kashmiri population was under Indian control and the rest under Pakistani control separated by a temporary cease-fire line (CFL). After two wars, 50 years of continual battle involving Kashmir, and upwards of 20,000 deaths, a nonmilitary solution to the situation does not exist, and to date no formal effort has ever been made by *the international community* (if such an organization even exists) to affix responsibility for the emergence of the Kashmir situation. Little indication exists that either India or Pakistan will make an effort in the future to find a solution to the Kashmir problem, which is at the core of problems in India-Pakistan relations. Neither side can politically afford peace, because in reference to Kashmir each side wins (at least politically in the short-term domestic arena) by constantly challenging the other.

<u>The history behind the current Kashmir dispute</u>

The former Indian Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir is made up of many regions, but is called *Jammu & Kashmir* (J&K or just Kashmir for short) because the two most populous regions in the state are named Jammu and Kashmir. Kashmir sits at one of the crossroads for invasion into the Indian subcontinent. It is a large multi-ethnic territory consisting of Dogra Hindus in Jammu, Punjabi Muslims in Poonch and Mirpur, Kashmiri Muslims and Pandits of the Srinagar Valley, the Shias of Kargil, and the Buddhists of Ladakh.[1]

Scythian Hindu princes ruled the area for centuries, followed by Tatars and then by Muslim invaders in the 14th century. Akbar conquered the area in 1586 and the Muslim Moguls ruled until their empire fell in the 18th century. An Afghan tribe ruled Kashmir until their defeat in 1819 by Maharaja Ranjit Singh (who left no heirs). Gulab Singh, a tributary chief and ruler of Jammu, collaborated with the British in helping them subdue the Sikh Punjab in the middle 19th century, and for this act the British (by the Treaty of Amritsar in 1846) gave the Valley (Vale) of Kashmir forever to Maharaja Gulab Singh and his male heirs. In return, the Maharaja acknowledged the supremacy of the British Indian Government in the areas of defense, foreign relations, and communications.

The precursor to the current Kashmir situation was British partition of the sub-continent in 1947 and the creation of India and Pakistan; a partition that resolved very little of the religious based problems it sought to pacify. Britain's main priority after WWII was to get out of the area as quickly as possible before anti-colonial politics became more radical and the violence more deadly. Britain agreed to indigenous self-rule and appointed Lord Mountbatten to relinquish power as the last Viceroy. In the succeeding negotiations, he directed the date of independence to be midnight of 14/15 August 1947.

At that time there was not a unitary idea of how to structure the new post-British government. Jawaharlal Nehru and the Indian Congress Party wanted a strong central government to implement economic development and national integration. Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his Muslim League rejected this, as they wanted autonomy for their own Muslim nation. Jinnah was forced by both the Congress Party and the British to decide between an undivided India without any guarantee of the Muslim share in power, or a sovereign Pakistan carved out of the Muslim-majority districts of Punjab and Bengal; Jinnah chose the latter.

When Lord Mountbatten announced on 3 June 1947 his plan to partition British India, he informed the rulers of the 565 semi-autonomous Princely States that after partition Britain would not be able to recognize any of them as independent dominions and expected them each to join with either India or Pakistan.[2] After Mountbatten released the final boundary awards, communal riots continued to rage, and a two-way exodus began with Muslims moving west to Pakistan and Sikhs and Hindus moving east to India.

Though Maharaja Sir Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir let 15 August come and go without announcing a decision, the Maharaja probably ceded to India two months later. The exact circumstance under which the accession to India was made is merely speculation as he left no known account of his life or of the historic moments that preceded and followed Indian and Pakistani nationhood. One can speculate that he was surely drawn to India by his own religion (Hinduism), but also towards Pakistan because of his Muslim population, the close geographical and economic links to Pakistan, and the power, status, and prestige he hoped to retain. One can conversely argue that the Maharaja probably became increasingly reluctant to cede to Pakistan as he viewed Pakistan as a one community theocratic state, whereas Kashmir nominally enjoyed a secular equality among its Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim population.[3]

The fact that Patan tribesmen attacked across Pakistan's border with Kashmir on 22 October 1947 is not in question. The Patans captured Muzaffarabad two days later and advanced in the direction of the Kashmiri capital of Srinagar. Kashmiri State forces, already weakened by attempting to quell an internal disturbance in Poonch (western Jammu), were overwhelmed. The Maharaja appealed to India for military help to repel the invaders, and Indian troops arrived in Srinagar only after the raiders already held one-third of the state. As a condition for sending troops, the Maharaja had to first agree to cede his land to India as Lord Mountbatten viewed this as sending federal troops outside the country. Fighting continued in Kashmir until India referred the issue to the UN and a subsequent UN-sponsored cease-fire ended the conflict on 1 January 1949.

The 1949 Cease Fire Line (CFL), renamed the Line of Control (LOC) in the 1972 Shimla Agreement, today divides all but 40 miles of

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reporting are mutually exclusive, and cannot be accomplished by the same unit, developed over many years during the Cold War. In actuality, most host nations do not differentiate much between U.S. DAOs and SAOs and often suspect SAO personnel of being closely tied to the DAOs and the DAO reporting mission. Additionally, the fact that both missions are currently being performed by DAOs in 55 countries helps debunk this belief. Therefore, it is a false conclusion that U.S. security assistance and cooperation programs would become suspect or ineffective, and lose their special position with host militaries, if these programs were to be run by a DAO. Would host militaries actually forego military assistance programs—including FMS, FMF, EDA, IMET, exercises, and humanitarian programs—and minimize their cooperation and collaboration with the United States if all SAOs are combined with DAOs or run by the same senior officer? This has not been the case at any of the current consolidated DAO-administered locations. In the short term, some host militaries may have some uncertainty and questions, but in all likelihood most would quickly adjust. U.S. national interests are not well served by allowing actual or perceived host nation sensitivities to dictate the structure and conduct of our security assistance and attaché programs, and in the worst case situations to permit them to be manipulated. Consolidated DAO/SAOs would offer a unity of command and effort currently lacking.

Joint DAO/SAO offices could also offer significant cost savings and personnel reductions in a time of diminishing resources. Presently, the manning of most SAOs and DAOs is stretched thin, many having only 2-3 personnel each (including local nationals) in smaller and mid-sized countries. In fact, of the current 79 separate SAOs, only 14 have ten or more personnel (including DSCA and command military, civilian, and local national personnel). Many SAOs are undermanned worldwide and—due to competing personnel requirements—the military services are having increasing difficulty keeping SAO billets filled with quality, trained personnel. Similarly, filling attaché system billets with the right personnel is a major challenge for DIA and the services. As a result, in many cases non-resident attachés have been accredited to countries where there is an established SAO, and as already discussed, in many other cases DAOs are running the military/security assistance missions when there is no separate in-country SAO.

Beginning in FY04, the combatant commands are scheduled to receive up to a 15 percent overall reduction in personnel strength, including in their overseas SAOs. According to DSCA, the manning levels for DSCA-funded positions worldwide was frozen for FY03 (629 total positions) and zero growth is expected in the future. And despite repeated calls within the USG for increases, little growth is expected in the overall number of military attachés around the world. Merging DAO and SAO functions would allow a smaller number of personnel with a reduced "footprint" to more efficiently and economically accomplish the respective missions.

According to one senior DSCA representative, the main problem with combining DAOs and SAOs is the "color of money". DAOs are primarily funded with General Defense Intelligence Program funds, whereas SAOs are funded with DSCA administrative funds, obtained through FMS sales, and to a lesser extent with combatant command operations and maintenance funds. However, rather than being a defining obstacle, this appears to be one of the issues to address in a consolidation. Certainly, the command finance offices already simultaneously handle a variety of funding lines—including the above and many more. Additionally, the myriad of separate directives and administrative guidance for establishing and managing DAOs and SAOs could be consolidated and standardized, since both units operate on embassy Country Teams.

The primary purpose of SAOs is to improve military-to-military cooperation, but to what purpose? Why does DoD focus its theater cooperation plans on providing security assistance around the globe, generously spending billions of dollars—over 11 billion USD in FY03 —in assistance? Not having the luxury of altruism, being conducted with taxpayer dollars, security assistance and cooperation programs are conducted as part of U.S. foreign policy strategy to better understand, influence, prepare, and preempt friends, foes, and fence-sitters alike. One of the prerequisites for successful security assistance/cooperation programs should be to better understand the capabilities, system, and plans of host nation militaries. Good operational interactions with the host nation and good intelligence are both needed for this. Additionally, SAOs cannot effectively conduct their security assistance and engagement missions if their personnel are not secure from military, terrorist, or criminal attack. SAO Chiefs often maintain they can have no connection with intelligence matters; however, the security assistance and force protection missions (when USDR) inherently rely upon good information to be effective.

Certainly, given the "intelligence failures" in recent years and post-9/11 demands for more and better HUMINT, the DoS and DAO reporting functions have increased significantly in importance. U.S. economic and military assistance programs are used to gain or increase influence around the world in support of foreign policy objectives, but little has been done to help improve the quality and quantity of information reporting by connecting aid programs to better cooperation and access to information supporting force protection, the global war on terrorism, and regional defense issues. Joint Publication 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, 5 April 2000, identifies four tenets of multinational military cooperation: respect, rapport, patience, and knowledge of partners. The publication states it is vital to "understand the doctrine, capabilities, strategic goals, culture, religion, customs, history, and values" of coalition and alliance partners. DAOs and SAOs are both ideally placed to obtain and provide this type of information.

The bottom line is that security assistance and cooperation missions are not incompatible with the information reporting mission and can actually be complementary. Increased involvement with security assistance missions would enhance DAO reporting on military and force protection issues, which in turn would help maximize the effectiveness of security assistance programs, as well as increase the security of in-country military personnel. Similarly to the three missions of DoS foreign-service teams—diplomatic representation, country reporting (political and economic), and aid programs—DoD personnel accomplish these same missions. State Department "cable" reporting is no different than the DAO reporting mission. The ability and propriety of DoS embassy personnel to conduct both reporting and assistance missions is never questioned. Likewise, there is no reason that consolidated military units could not also simultaneously perform the representation, reporting, and assistance missions. The issue of creating a better operational synergy between SAO and DAO mission areas deserves future study and consideration.

However, despite the high number of DAOs currently running security assistance programs, the key stakeholders in the present system—the combatant commands, DIA, and DSCA—have previously not been overly supportive of consolidated DAO/SAO missions and have perpetuated the split-unit approach. DIA generally believes separate DAOs are preferable due to the "specialized" sales and training functions of SAOs. Furthermore, in cases where DAO and SAO functions or offices are merged, since DAO personnel are the only diplomatically-accredited officers assigned, DIA contends that consolidated units must remain under DIA "ownership". DIA opposes placing the attaché representation and reporting functions under the purview of an SAO Chief. DSCA and the combatant commands have also been generally hesitant to allow DIA to manage their security assistance and cooperation programs. One unified commander stated to the author that DAOs should not do the SAO jobs and SAOs should not do the DAO jobs.

In actuality, several good "templates" already exist in the system for consolidated DAO/ SAOs. In most cases, these anomalies exist due to the low relative significance of the countries to U.S. foreign policy or to the particular desires of the host nation, the ambassador, or the command. Probably the best known is the "Moscow model" where the senior military diplomat, a general officer, is dual-hatted as the DATT and the SAO Chief. Israel and Mexico follow this model as well. In these cases, the DAO reports to DIA and the SAO to its combatant command, but both have a common boss—the DATT. In other countries like India and Indonesia, there is an SAO Chief who is subordinate to the DATT—in India the ODC Chief and in Indonesia the Military Attaché for Defense Programs (similar to Defense Cooperation Attaché). In many smaller countries, including much of Africa and in special cases such as Canada, China, and Suriname in South America, the DAO performs all security assistance/engagement functions for the regional command—in some cases with command augmentation. In the "Jordan model," where the SAO Chief has been accredited as the DATT, the opposite case exists. These special cases offer insight into how an overall consolidated DAO/SAO system could be established and work.

Summary And Recommendations

The future ability of the DoD to adequately resource separate military entities at each U.S. embassy worldwide will be significantly reduced by budgetary, personnel, and political realities. In this light, except for a few possible special cases, such as Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Egypt, Turkey, and possibly Jordan and Kuwait, having more consolidated DAO/SAO units and operations would offer many advantages over the current split-unit system, including a unity of command and effort at each embassy, a reduction in committed DoD personnel and other resources, improved security and reduced force protection vulnerability, and a synergy between the DAO and SAO missions. Several models exist for such a consolidation but, in any case, the most important requirement is that in each country only one senior military officer—regardless of his/her organizational subordination—be responsible for and "own" all in-country military activities, including representation, advisory, reporting, military assistance/cooperation, and force protection of in-country non-combatant command military personnel. For the reasons discussed in this paper, the DATT is best-suited to be assigned responsibility for these collective duties. This corresponds to the third option under consideration by JCS/J5--consolidating embassy-based programs under one senior officer and eliminating the need for a separate USDR designation. The office responsible for consolidated DAO/SAO activities should be called the Defense Attaché Office but, depending upon its size, several configurations and/or chains of command could work.

The most preferable would be along the lines of the Moscow model with a DATT in charge of a DAO, as well as a separate SAO headed by a diplomatically-accredited "Defense Cooperation Attaché" who is directly responsible for all security assistance programs. Another configuration would be for the DATT and the service attachés to directly manage the security assistance/cooperation programs, possibly with augmentation from the respective combatant commands—the Suriname model. A third possible configuration would be for the DAO to have three subordinate sections—1) attaché operations (representation, advisory, reporting, and force protection), 2) security assistance/cooperation, and 3) common support staff.

Assigning one senior officer, the DATT, responsibility for the SAO, as well as the DAO, would create the necessary unity of command and effort, but would still require some "massaging" of the rating chain to address concerns of the key stakeholders. Some acceptable compromises would involve DIA being the first line rater for DATTs with the combatant commander or his/her Chief of Staff being the senior rater. Alternatively, the rater for DATTs could be the combatant commander or designated representative with DIA as the senior rater. When assigned, the Defense Cooperation Attaché, in charge of the SAO programs, would report to the DATT and then be senior-rated at the combatant command. Other SAO personnel would be rated by the Defense Cooperation Attachéand then senior-rated at the command. The DATT would continue to rate the ARMA, AIRA, and ALUSNA, who would all be senior-rated by DIA.

Another more extreme approach would decentralize the management of DAOs, placing them under the purview of their respective regional commanders. Using the DSCA system of having regional command personnel perform the security assistance missions on behalf of DSCA, the reporting mission could be accomplished using attaché and intelligence personnel assigned to the combatant command's in-country military team. Just as DSCA and DISAM create the hiring, standardization, training, and policies and procedures for the security assistance programs and personnel—which are then managed by the combatant commands—DIA and the JMAS could create the standards, hiring, training, requirements, and operations policies and procedures for the intelligence reporting mission which could then be managed by the regional commands.

As stated above, whatever the configuration or chain of command, one senior officer in country must be in charge of all military missions. Although a merger of DAO and SAO activities under could require changes in certain laws directing security assistance missions, unity of command/effort is paramount. To be fully prepared to manage both missions, all DATTs should attend both the DIA JMAS and the DISAM Security Assistance Managers Overseas Course (SAM-O). Any designated Defense Cooperation Attachés should also attend JMAS training, in addition to the SAM-O course. Other service attachés would attend SAM-O as required by duties.

With the JCS/J5 preparing to make a recommendation to DoD on changes to the USDR designation and system of in-country responsibility, additional discussion and debate is needed on this issue within military policy and academic circles to ensure that a solution is reached which best meets the needs of the combatant commanders, DIA, and DSCA. For decades to come, the decision could impact the way security assistance, military-to military cooperation, in-country force protection, and intelligence reporting is conducted by the DoD.

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Quarterly Column

MIDDLE EAST REVIEWS



Reviews by LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein (USNR)

Cairo by Andre' Raymond translated by Willard Wood. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 436 pages, 2000

Originally a French book published in 1993 under the title *Le'Caire*, this translation is a vital work in understanding an extraordinary capital of the Arab world. It is Cairo, more than any other city in the Middle East that has influenced the region culturally, politically and religiously. It is also a city in crisis, designed to hold seven million people, it today has crammed over twelve million into its narrow streets, alleys and even the mausoleums where the dead share space with the living.

The book is divided into four parts that take readers into four phases of Cairo's development. It begins with the foundations of Cairo as an Arab military encampment used to launch a final invasion against the Byzantium rulers in their capital Alexandria. The camp called Fustat was established in 642 AD and the Arabs led by Amr ibn al Aas. The Byzantine Greek Christians, who ruled Egypt, and Coptic Christians detested one another and were divided making their defeat easy. It is here, we see the second Caliph Omar ibn al-Khattab ruling from Medina experimented with building a canal be built linking the granaries of the Nile Delta to awaiting ships along the Red Sea which would then transport grain and other foods to Arabia.

The Fatimids, were the only Shiite Muslim group to rule Egypt in the the tenth century. They further urbanized Cairo and gave its name *Qahira*. The origin of this name varies but the author seems partial to the story that when the city was to be built the alignment of the planet Mars (*Al-Qahir*) was taking place and hence its name. Another popular story is that the city was originally built above the Muqattam Hills and could repel (*Taqhar*) enemies, hence the word repel became Qahira. Today remnants of the Fatimids can be seen, like their founding of the Al-Azhar Mosque in 972AD. Ironically founded by a Shiite dynasty, it has evolved over a thousand years to a center of Sunni Islamic thought. Al-Azhar was not only a religious center, but also an institution that trained medical doctors, astronomers and mathematicians. Al-Azhar University has produced many religious scholars many who are moderate and progressive and others who are radical alumni of this institution. Many of the ideologues of the Islamic militant movement today got their education at Al-Azhar, like Sheikh Omar Abd-al-Rahman, several leaders of the Afghan movement to drive the Soviets out of their country are graduates. Also the late Sayyed Qutb, an Egyptian executed by Egyptian President Nasser for his writings in which he argued that the clergy should decide which rulers are worthy of governing. Other legacies of the Fatimids that can be seen today are a series of walls and main city gates like the Gate of Victory (*Bab-al-Nasr*) and the Gate of Conquest (*Bab-al-Futuh*) built in 1087.

The book continues looking at the Arab, Ottoman, French and English influences on the city and its urban planning. Readers should be aware of an underlying theme, Cairo has always segregated its poor, ethnic and religious populations and today's population explosion can no longer sustain this division. The reign of Ismail Pasha (1863-1879) saw a modernizing of Cairo but his mounting debts, led to the eventual control of Egypt by British and French financiers and finally British forces in 1882. The British would not leave Egypt until 1954 and a curious arrangement took place in which non-Egyptians, primarily Europeans, had their own courts of law, businesses, clubs and lived in a parallel yet elite world separate from the main population. This of course caused resentment and the system lasted until 1952, with the dismantling of the mixed courts occurring in 1949.

Why read about Cairo? As discussed about the impact of Al-Azhar on a spectrum of Islamic thought from moderate to radical, it is also where the city in which the Palestine Liberation Organization was founded, where numerous Arab summits have taken place. This is an excellent book for those with a specialization in Middle-East affairs.

The Arabists: The Romance of an American Elite by Robert Kaplan. Free Press, a Division of Simon and Schuster, New York. 312 pages, 1993.

Robert Kaplan is perhaps best known for his book *Balkan Ghosts* that details the historic animosity between Serbs, Croats and Bosnians. This book was recommended to me by a colleague in the Pentagon and having read it, should be among the top ten books a Middle East FAO reads. Not that I agree with his analysis or assessments, but it delves into the complex relationship of State Department personnel who have pursued careers in Middle East affairs with several administrations and Secretaries of State. It looks at the evolution of the label Arabist, from when it meant going on shopping excursions to the bazaar to those who have dedicated their lives to the study of Arabic in the Arab world and finally a derogatory label as an anti-Semite.

The book does highlight some extraordinary Americans who worked behind the scenes to rescue Ethiopian Falasha Jews in Operation Moses to the controversial meeting between the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, and Saddam Hussein in July 1990. Kaplan categorizes Americans who have lived in the region as missionaries, diplomats or businessmen, each with their own subculture. He is also highly critical of the State Department's method of training Middle East specialists. Interviewing former Foreign Service Officers, Kaplan revels that the one year program that was formerly in Beirut, Lebanon and the instructors who were from the Levant typically indoctrinated young diplomats into thinking a certain way about the Middle East. It also labeled them, sometimes unfairly as being anti-Israeli.

Over a decade since the book was published, the events of September 11th have caused an upsurge in those studying Islam, the Near East and South Asia. Reading this book offers ways of learning from the past in how the United States will educate and grow the next generation of Middle East specialists for service to our country.

Muhammad at Mecca by W. Montgomery Watt. Oxford at the Clarendon Press, London, 1965. 192 pages. Review by Major Randy Koehlmoos, US Army, a South Asia FAO stationed at US-CENTCOM, MacDill AFB, Florida.

Though the publishing date of 1965 may initially dismiss this work to the back shelves of university libraries, current events further highlight the need to reevaluate Islam in a classical context prior to formulating and making judgement. Juxtaposed with the common Oriental view that Operation Enduring Freedom is merely the so-called Christian powers fighting a continuing war against Islam under the auspices of combating terrorism is the far too common Occidental perception that Muslims in exploding rental cars have replaced the Red Horde as the enemy of the civilized world. Both views are inane as OEF is not the fifth crusade and true Islam seeks peace and submission to the will of Allah in stark contrast with destruction of the West and reinstating the Caliphate.

W. Montgomery Watt is an esteemed Orientalist and leading authority on Islam who wrote *Muhammad at Mecca* in response to his perceived need for a new look at the life of the Holy Prophet Muhammad set in a fuller historical context. Watt states that part of this need arose from the broader desire of twentieth century historians to see historical events in relation to the economic, social, and political background prevalent at that particular time. The author also asserts that the special feature of this biography of Muhammad is thus, not that it combs available sources more minutely than others have done previously, but that it pays fuller attention to material factors, and attempts to answer many questions that have hardly been raised in the past. Together with Watt's other book *Muhammad at Medina,* these two volumes constitute a comprehensive history of the life of Muhammad.

Watt declares in the introduction that this work is first and foremost written for the historian. He warns though that inherently a human inclination of 'tendential shaping' exists by early historians to make allowances for distortions, or even to make ideology more acceptable within the shadow of other religions such as Christianity or Judaism. Though many of the bibliographic sources Watt used for this work are based on earlier primary sources, written documents beyond the Holy Qur'an detailing the Prophet's life prior to about 150 years after his death do not exist. Watt addresses the need to examine the appeal of Islam to its followers based on economic and political factors, and not just pure religious principles. The Qur'an contains traditional historical evidence of Meccan times, but to expect the Qur'an to be a socially historical document highlighting the economic, social, and political aspects of daily life is beyond the intention of its design.

In general Watt accepts traditional accounts as true and rejects anecdotes only when discounted by internal contradictions. Though a risky approach, information available prior to the *hijrah* to Medina is limited and to quote Watt, 'shadowy.' This situation may seem fertile ground for time and skepticism to cloud the legacy, but similarly it could actually be more factual; some historians view verbal transmissions as a more accurate and authentic portrayal than their written counterparts (a view also used with reference to the Veda's). By keeping stories oral, no scribe can be accused of misprints, and no mispronunciations are allowed during its retelling; likewise one can focus on the story itself instead of the author's reputation.

Though Watt is very capable of religious criticism (see also his *Muslim-Christian Encounters; Perceptions and Misperceptions*, Routledge, 1991), he remains neutral on sensitive religious questions at issue between Christianity and Islam in this particular work. He attempts to present Christian readers with historical material that must be taken into account before forming theological judgements and many times shows the similarity and historical connections between the three religions of the book--Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. To avoid alienating the attentions of the Christian readers he is attempting to influence with the issue of divinity within the Qur'an, Watt writes from the perspective of 'the Qur'an says' and not 'God says' or 'Muhammad says.'

Contemporaneously for the Muslim reader Watt avoids issues that would reject any of the fundamental doctrines of Islam, so long as his scrutinizing remains faithful to the standards of Western historical scholarship. Though this statement is problematic with those who denounce Western ideologies as being the only acceptable standard, Watt rightly states that a rift between Western scholarship and Islamic faith is avoidable. Watt does note Western hesitance to accept nine year old Ali as possessing the mental maturity to actually accept the practice of Islam on his own merit and to therefore be considered the first male Muslim, which elevates Western scholarship above that of the followers of Ali (the entire Shia community).

Mohammad at Mecca follows a chronological progression, and initially draws attention to the features of the Arabian background (the district surrounding Mecca) that are most important for a proper understanding of Muhammad's early career and achievements. Mecca developed as a trading and financial center at the crossroad of the caravan routes, and this setting impacted the Qur'an as it first appeared; not in the atmosphere of the secluded desert but in that of high finance in the shadow of Jewish and Christian influences. Watt attributes problems within Mecca as arising out of change from a nomadic existence based on physical struggle within the harsh desert to a sedentary capitalist economy, without an accompanying change in community attitudes. Mohammad was a statesman from the beginning, and Watt details Meccan politics and its impact on the personal views of the Prophet. The legacy of this is the message of solidarity and the community of Islam (the *ummah*) surpassing clan, tribal, and nationalistic lines.

Being an orphan at an young age dominated Muhammad's early life, and Watt brings to light those stories and accounts of the young Prophet's life that both appeal to and repulse secular historians. He notes that those in the latter category are theological characters that chronologically are found to quiver under scrutiny, but still pass profound and valuable messages and hold significance for Muslims. Watt brings attention to contradictions in perceived facts about Muhammad's visions, and attributes some of the disparity to the problems inherent with the interpretation of language. Watt even goes as far as to make recommendations to adjust certain meanings to remain both Islamically orthodox and within the realm of historical probability, to such a degree that he as a Western historian has confidence in the statements.

Watt brings to light the fact that the primary message in the Qur'an can be confused by differences in Western importance on bare facts verses significance, and on Eastern importance that shows little difference. Arab society at the time did not define things in terms of right and wrong but as honorable and dishonorable. Concerns still exist in regard to proper chronology and contradictions as ideas and directives change throughout the text of the Qur'an, giving concern as to which is the final directive. Watt tries to remain neutral in explanations of events and performs what he calls 'creative irruption' to take a middle ground between chance and divine intervention. He concludes by examination that the Qur'an attributes the troubles at that time in Mecca as primarily religious with essentially religious remedies despite their economic, social, and moral undercurrents.

Watt discusses that the early days of Islam were far from opposition. He examines this from the point of 'How did opposition manifest itself and what were the main motives behind it?' In his attempt at discussion of the satanic verses and their motives and explanations, other possibilities arise such as Muhammad reacting to public opinion or pressure from other groups. He concludes that existence of Angels does not violate the Islamic tenant of monotheism, and this fact is again related to the similar beliefs in the sister religions of Christianity and Judaism. Watt determines that the Qur'an tends to confirm the accounts derived from traditional historical material, and that the principle opposition to Muhammad's claim to be a Prophet was to the political implications of him becoming the new ruler as opposed to resistance to a new religion.

The final chapter of the book discusses the deterioration in Muhammad's position in Mecca and the *hijrah* to Medina. At this point Islam is considered to be historically complete, but most of its institutions were still in a very rudimentary state. Again, Watt addresses the point that nomadic ethics and outlook were well suited to desert conditions but proved unsatisfactory for settled communities.

This work is most relevant for those persons desiring advanced study of the grossly misperceived religion of Islam, which the Western world erroneously blames for the mainly historical, economic, and social problems of the Muslim world. Watt's work supports historical in contrast to religious scholarship in the hope of overcoming contemporary *jahiliyya* (state of ignorance). Ancient prejudice coupled with the contemporary media-induced Islamic stereotype of Islam as a violent foreign religion perpetuates the misperception of political and religious Islam as a 21st century threat when in fact W. Montgomery Watt shows that Islam has many parallels with Christianity and Judaism and is not a medieval enemy lurking in the darkness.

(Continued from page 20)
Indian and Pakistani controlled sectors of Kashmir. The area currently defined as the disputed territory of Kashmir is not the same area as 1947 Kashmir.[4] China has occupied the area of Ladakh known as Aksai Chin since its 1962 war with India, and with the 1963 Border Agreement between Pakistan and China, Pakistan lost ground marked on the map as Kashmir to China but gained a formal demarcated northern boundary. In the early 1980s, the dispute over the Siachen Glacier arose. Siachen lies beyond the northern terminal point of the LOC at map coordinate NJ9842, which is 40 miles short of the China-Pakistan border as defined by their 1963 agreement. Pakistan discovered in August 1983 that an Indian reconnaissance patrol had established a camp on one of the glacier's branches, and on 13 April 1984 India launched Operation *Meghdoot* that placed troops on mountain outposts that dominated the approaches to the Siachen Glacier. Since then, the two countries have battled over where (and whether) the real border exists.

While Hindu-Muslim violence continued with increasing frequency and with growing numbers of lives lost in all of India, the problem took on a new dimension in Kashmir in the 1980s. In Jammu and Kashmir, the arguments about political and cultural estrangement from the Indian Union are to a large extent refracted through the belief that India had economically neglected and marginalized Jammu and Kashmir.[5] Severe unrest followed by breaches of the LOC destroyed the relative peace in existence since 1972. The hostage-for-prisoner swap by the Indian Government in 1989 marked the start in earnest of Kashmir's armed separatist insurgency.[6] Some people also point to the rigged Indian national elections of 1986 and 1987 as the reason that pushed the Kashmiris over the political edge; others state multiple causes based on policy failures in New Delhi, political and social events in Kashmir, or of course to the political designs of Pakistan. Muslims in Kashmir appeared frustrated with the denial of full democracy as well as the federal autonomy promised after independence and are always fearful of the rise of militant Hindu nationalism. After India's imposition of emergency rule and the suspension of constitutional rights within Kashmir, the entire movement continued to grow and started to include the demand of independence from both Indian and Pakistani controlled portions of Kashmir.

Since 1989, India has dealt with the Kashmir crisis as a crisis of foreign intervention and an issue of Islamic fundamentalism rather than one of political legitimacy and representation within the Indian Union.[7] Pakistani estimates are that by 1993 over 600,000 India military and para-military personnel were active in the Kashmir area operating against up to 35 different militant resistance groups, some opposed as much to each other as to the Indian government. As one ethnic group seeks to assert its rights, other groups react and seek to define and defend their own interests.

Conclusion

Because neither the Indian nor Pakistani government is politically strong enough to make major concessions on the Kashmir issue, the chance of a settlement remains remote.[8] India relies on the religious based chaos in the Kashmir valley to justify the need to maintain a strong, centralized, and secular government. For Islamic Pakistan, the struggle against the *Hindu bogeyman* is the unifying factor to which it is wholly subservient. As long as India and Pakistan both covet the Kashmiri capital of Srinagar, and see the dispute in highly emotional and ideological terms, every conceivable bilateral settlement is insupportable. Any solution would inevitably make one side or the other conclude itself the loser, and this would be political suicide for any party in power to accept.

ARMY NOTES

LTC(P) Peter Brigham , Chief, Strategic Leadership Division

The Army's Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program is designed to train and develop officers to meet worldwide requirements for officers skilled in the analysis of regional military/security, economic, social, cultural, psychological or political policies and issues that potentially impact on the military-political environment. Positions filled by Army FAOs typically include: Attaches, Security Assistance Officers, Political-Military Officers, Liaison Officers, Advisors, Arms Control Specialists, and Instructors. FAOs combine professional military skills with regional expertise, language competency and politico-military awareness. They offer a unique combination of skills to advance U.S. interests in a region. A FAO can best be described as the Army's "Soldier-Statesman."

The life cycle of a FAO is based on three pillars: institutional training, operational assignments and self-development. These three aspects focus and shape FAO management in terms of accession, training, and utilization. The program entails a lengthy education and training commitment to develop officers who will serve as regional specialists in the grades of major, lieutenant colonel and colonel.

Officers are accessed into the FAO functional area (FA 48) as captains (between their 5th and 6th years of service), based upon the needs of the Army, officer preference, GRE scores, language aptitude, military experience and, in some cases, undergraduate performance. However, they are not generally considered for FA 48 training and assignment until they are branch qualified in their basic branch. Moreover, officers are formally designated FA 48 only via the Army's Career Field Designation (CFD) Board (following selection to major, at the 10th year of service) or via a CFD transfer from another career field.

After successful completion of company level command, FAOs begin training between their eighth and tenth year of service. These officers undergo an intensive three-year developmental program in one of the nine FAO regional Areas Of Concentration (Americas - 48B, Europe - 48C, South Asia - 48D, Eurasia - 48E, China - 48F, Middle East/North Africa - 48G, Northeast Asia - 48H, Southeast Asia - 48I, and Africa - 48J). Each officer learns a foreign language, conducts in-country training (ICT) under the supervision of a senior FAO, and earns a regionally focused graduate degree. The Army sees all three phases as crucial to producing an officer fully qualified to provide political-military expertise at the operational and strategic levels and across the full spectrum of military operations.

FA 48 incorporates a professional officer development career plan offering maximum diversity for schooling and assignment. The Army currently supports approximately 710 FAO authorizations worldwide with a total of 1062 FA 48 officers, which includes over 200 FAOs in training. Of these positions, only 25% are in Army organizations and approximately 75% are in Department of Defense and other activities. FAOs serve best where they actively support operational and strategic requirements and, not surprisingly, the majority of Army FAO billets are in overseas locations.

LTC Ray Hodgkins/693-2198

USMC FAO Notes

LtCol John May, International Affairs Officer Program Coordinator

The USMC International Affairs Officer Program (IAOP) continues to gain momentum. In addition to coordinating the selection, training, and utilization of FAOs and RAOs , the International Issues Branch (PLU) of HQMC responsibility for the Marine Corps Personnel Exchange Program (MCPEP) in the summer of 2003. The transfer of this program is intended to more closely align these two populations of officers serving in unique overseas billets—thereby better managing this critical manpower resource and more fully exploiting their regional expertise. This was the same objective that was hoped to be achieved when PLU took control of both the Olmsted Scholar Program and Foreign Professional Military Education Programs; results from all of these initiatives have been favorable.

The annual IAOP selection board identified 18 qualified applicants—10 FAOs and 8 RAOs—for entry into the study-track training pipeline. In accordance with the IAOP training timeline, twelve of these International Affairs Officers (IAOs) in-training will begin their education at the Naval Postgraduate School in Jan 03; the remaining six officers are scheduled to start school in June of 2004. Congratulations to this group of officers who will meet our Corps requirements for regional expertise in FY05 and beyond.

A recent trip to Monterey found all the officers selected on the FY04 IAOP study track board decisively engaged in their regional studies at NPS. The arranged deferments for officers committed to OIF proved unnecessary as all candidates had returned home with sufficient time to pack their families and report to the registrar. Reports from NPS students and faculty remain positive. The efforts to identify utilization tours for the RAOs as soon as possible in their program—in order to provide greater focus to their research—have yielded notable great progress. To further support their thesis work, a more efficient use of the limited IAOP budget has increased opportunities for RAO research trips abroad. Majors Deets and Wilkes, attending conferences in Ethiopia and Belgium respectively, were the first to take advantage of the budgetary shift. The RAO assignments had been narrowed down by Aug will be finalized by Dec; this is the result of an increasingly close working relationship with MMOA and steps toward a more requirements-driven assignment process.

The majority of the FAO in-training population that had been on ICT completed their POIs in the fall of 03. The FAOs training at the 5 new ICT sites—Major Coady in Greece, Major Winn in India, Capt Pappas in the Philippines, Capt Lasica in Russia, and Capt Bates in Turkey—have all returned to primary MOS billets in the operational forces. Most other sites experienced turnovers as well: Major Sbragia replaced Capt Martin in China; Capt Ercolano replaced Major Kendall in Japan; Major Rosser replaced Capts Benitez, Cho, and Dominguez in Korea; Major Thurman replaced Capt Lasica in Moscow.

Four other ICT sites, three of them new, were manned in the latter part of 2003: Major Finney stood up a new post in Brazil, Major Lucius became the Corps' first FAO in Indonesia, and Capt Avila manned a site in Senegal for the first time. Though not a new site, Capt Rizner brought the Marine FAO program back to Vietnam after a 4-year absence. Two FAOs currently on ICT—Major Mollohan in Thailand and

Capt Sullivan in Egypt—have requested and been granted ICT extensions to more fully complete their education/training and to facilitate follow-on assignments.

The HQMC International Issues Branch (PLU) is fully engaged in the OSD ordered Defense Language Transformation Study being conducted by SAIC. The study will help achieve the objectives of OSD vision for the way language and regional expertise is valued, developed, and employed throughout the DoD. An internal Marine Corps study, the results of which were published in the summer of 2003, indicate that the IAOP is ahead of the bow wave this transformational initiative. Many of the stated objectives of the effort—to include integrating regional expertise into operational units, improving the career paths of FAOs, and increasing the size of the population—have been met or are gaining traction. We welcome the support and increased emphasis from OSD and their recognition of the value of the International Affairs Officer unique capability.

*A*s always, the International Issues Branch (PLU), PP&O, HQMC welcomes comments and suggestions regarding the administration of the IAOP. Please see the FAO Proponent Page in this Journal for POC information.

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many world governments, neither India nor Pakistan was flexible or willing to seek a solution. For now, the only bilateral solution agreed to is war, and fighting over Kashmir will continue. As South Asia is perhaps the only region in the world where conflicts occur under the threat of nuclear weapons use by both belligerents, this is justification enough to continue to pursue this problem outside of its regional boundaries.

MAJ Randy Koehlmoos is a South Asia FAO who conducted in-country training at the Pakistani Command and Staff College, Quetta Pakistan. He is currently assigned to HQ, USCENTCOM.

Footnotes

[1] The estimated 1985 population of the Pakistan controlled portion of Kashmir was 2.8 million people, and the estimated 1991 population of the Indian controlled portion was 7.72 million. In rough terms of geographic size, Pakistan controls an area the size of the US State of South Carolina, India that of Kentucky, and China that of Maryland. Source: Microsoft Encarta 99 Encyclopedia.

[2] The Indian Princely States (of which J&K was one) were those areas in the Indian subcontinent which were for internal purposes outside the administrative, legislative, and judicial sphere of the British Government of India. These states covered more than half the area and were referred to as “Indian India”. The other India was British India, comprising the provinces and certain other areas. The two Indias disappeared with the Indian Independence Act of 1947, and by subsequent integration of the Princely States with the Dominions of India and Pakistan.

[3] Mohammad Ali Jinnah's desire was for a secular Muslim homeland that still respected those persons of other religions. It was never his idea to create a sectarian nation ruled by Islamic law. Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan, and Islamic Identity*, p. 104.

[4] The historical area of Kashmir is roughly equal in square miles to the U.S. State of Utah.

[5] Vernon Hewitt, *The new international politics of South Asia*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1997, p. 143.

[6] Jonathan Karp, "Caught in the Middle," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 1995, p. 14-15.

[7] Hewitt, p. 13.

[8] Ahmed Rashid, "Out of the Shadows," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 December 1993, p. 23.

USAF FAO Notes

LtCol Mike Nolta, USAF

CURRENT STATE OF THE AIR FORCE FOREIGN AREA OFFICER (FAO) PROGRAM

US Air Force senior leadership recognizes the critical need to develop officers with foreign language and regional political-military (Pol-Mil) skills. The challenge is to balance officer career development with current and future Foreign Area Officer (FAO) requirements in a resource-constrained environment.

The Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) established the Air Force FAO Program within the International Airmen Division, Policy Directorate (SAF/IAPA). The AF FAO program stood up in 1997 to track officers with foreign language and regional skills, and to provide training opportunities that maintain and improve those skills. FAO is a career-broadening specialty; positions requiring this specialized skill set are identified with the 16FXX Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) and are filled by officers from all career specialties. The FAO program targets officers with a basic level of existing language/regional skills and further develops those skills to meet AF needs.

Currently, the FAO program remains a secondary/career-broadening AFSC. The Air Force also maintains an AFSC for Political/Military Officer (16P), but 16Ps are considered "general" Pol-Mil officers. What differentiates the 16P from the 16F is the FAO's foreign language capability and knowledge of Pol-Mil issues specific to their region of expertise. Officers who possess the 16F AFSC receive an AFSC suffix that identifies their region of expertise. Those regions include:

16FXA - Air Attaché (any geographic region)

16FXB - Central Asia / East Europe / Russia

16FXC - Latin America

16FXD - East Asia / China

16FXE - Southeast Asia

16FXF - Middle East / North Africa

16FXG - Sub-Saharan Africa

16FXH - Western Europe

SAF/IAPA currently tracks over 1500 officers with FAO skills. Generally, officers obtain their FAO skills prior to commissioning or outside their current duties. Additionally, officers must identify themselves to SAF/IAPA and apply for the FAO AFSC. Roughly 35% of Air Force FAOs have language skills at the professionally "fluent" level, defined as a Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) score of Reading-3 & Listening-3. Air Force FAO program manages several language and regional studies training programs focused on helping Air Force officers develop and maintain those capabilities.

The capstone Air Force FAO language program is the Language and Area Studies Immersion (LASI), a one-month intensive in-country immersion. LASIs are offered in 40 languages in 39 locations; 254 officers completed a LASI in 2003, and over 1500 officers have completed a LASI since 1997. Officers are required to complete the DLPT prior to *and* immediately after completion of the LASI; DLPT scores improved for 99% of Air Force officers trained. SAF/IAPA also sponsors one-on-one language tutoring for FAOs with at least a basic knowledge of a foreign language, and recently contracted for on-line language training. Both language programs provide beginner and intermediate instruction in FAO targeted languages. Although most of the training opportunities sponsored by SAF/IAPA are targeted at FAOs, the LASI and the online language courses are available to all AF officers.

Language is half the equation for developing a FAO, and DLPT scores offer an objective measure for this capability. The capability to deal with Pol-Mil issues specific to the region is not as measurable as language skills, but regional Pol-Mil skills are just as important. SAF/IAPA sponsors Air Force officer participation in regional studies seminars offered through the State Department's Foreign Service Institute, Air Force Special Operations School, and DoD Strategic Studies Centers. In 2003, 84 officers completed SAF/IA sponsored regional seminars; over 300 have completed these programs since 1998. SAF/IAPA also sponsors or advertises a variety of master's degree, research, and related programs.

Multiple on-going FAO program initiatives exist, including the creation of a senior-level Executive Steering Group to oversee Air Force foreign language issues sponsored by SAF/IA and SAF/XO. SAF/IAPA also encouraged increased foreign language emphasis early in an officer's career by establishing extended LASI opportunities (2-3 months) for graduating US Air Force Academy and Air Force ROTC cadets before starting primary career training. SAF/IAPA has expanded ties with the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) in order to ensure FAO positions are filled with well-qualified FAOs, and assists the Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) Center with their FAO contingency TDY requirements.

Despite these efforts, there are several key challenges to further developing a FAO corps that meets Air Force requirements. AF officers often receive initial language training immediately prior to assignments that require that language. The Air Force must shift from "just-in-time" language training to early career/pre-accession training with continued development throughout an officer's career . FAOs must be *deliberately developed*: it takes several years of intensive training and several assignments to develop a well qualified FAO and these skills are perishable if not maintained through training/experience.

Finding the best-qualified officer to fill FAO positions (including Air Attaché positions) remains a challenge. The FAO program remains a secondary/career broadening assignment and only senior AF leader involvement and support will focus attention on utilization of their critical skills while ensuring FAOs remain competitive for promotion. Additionally, the Air Force must better align FAO skill sets to current and future requirements. Currently, 41% of our Air Force FAOs are European experts while only 5% are Middle Eastern experts. This will require identification of new and revalidation of current Air Force requirements.

For more information on the Air Force FAO program, visit the Air Force FAO web site at https://fao.hq.af.mil.

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